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Executive Summary 
 
This report is based on ten weeks of field research in Burundi, between April and June 2010. This 
research was one of the activities of the Peace Security and Development Network (PSDN) working 
group on community security and community-based Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 
(DDR). The aim of this working group is to contribute to our understanding of how to connect 
community security and DDR programmes in a context specific way. The research in Burundi builds 
further on insights from an earlier report of the working group “Security Promotion in Fragile States: 
Can Local Meet National?” (Willems et. al., 2009), and a case study of eastern DRC (Rouw and 
Willems, 2010). The current report is based on a variety of research approaches, such as focus group 
discussions, semi-structured interviews, key informant interviews, and participatory observation. 
 
The report starts with a background on conflict in Burundi and the DDR programmes undertaken 
there.  Subsequently, ex-combatants’ motivations for mobilization are explored as well as the relations 
between the different actors involved in the DDR process in Burundi. Compared to many other 
countries in which DDR programmes are taking place, in Burundi, economic motivations appeared to 
be relatively less important in combatants’ decisions to stop fighting. Relations between the 
Burundian government and the international community (especially the World Bank) have been 
problematic, leading to frustrations on both sides and delays in funding of the DDR programme, and 
consequently delayed payments of DDR benefits to ex-combatants. The fact that the DDR programme 
from the start prioritized working through the national government had important consequences for 
the extent to which the programme was rooted and embedded at the sub-national level. Indeed, in the 
case of Burundi, we encountered a lot of frustration about the lack of involvement of local actors, such 
as local NGOs, community members and ex-combatants themselves.  
 
Looking at how DDR has been perceived on the ground, one must conclude DDR in Burundi has not 
been successful in terms of economic reintegration. While the primary motivation for demobilization 
for many combatants was their idea that they had achieved the political aims for which they had 
initially taken up arms, after demobilization, the way in which the programme assisted them 
economically certainly became more important to them. Indeed, there is discussion internationally on 
whether DDR should have the simple and short-term aim of deterring ex-combatants from playing a 
‘spoiler’ role after conflict, or rather should have a longer-term character and indeed aim to assist ex-
combatants to become productive and participating members of society. Yet, even if we consider DDR 
to have a very limited role in the long-term economic reintegration of ex-combatants, directly or 
through associated programmes, we cannot but conclude that economic reintegration of ex-
combatants in Burundi has been highly inadequate. The real needs of ex-combatants were high. In 
addition, rumors and miscommunications further raised expectations, and subsequently raised the 
frustrations of ex-combatants.  
 
The idleness and economic problems of many ex-combatants further hamper their social reintegration, 
as those contribute to stigmatization and perceptions of ex-combatants being criminals. Whereas 
economic motivations often were not the main reason for demobilizing, the lack of economic support 
does affect the reintegration process. In addition, at first sight social reintegration has gone relatively 
smoothly, and it was indicated that problems between ex-combatants and communities decreased 
over time. Yet, depending on what qualifies as successful reintegration, critical remarks can be made 
on the level of social reintegration in Burundi. Efforts have primarily focused on providing ex-
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combatants and communities with tools to resolve conflict and prevent stigmatization. Hardly any 
attention has been given to psycho-social rehabilitation and reconciliation. Of course, the question is in 
how far addressing the past and healing relationships is a realistic goal in the short-term, and whether 
this should be considered part of DDR. However, in the communities visited, it turned out that 
reconciliation is an inevitable part of the long-term process of social reintegration. Thus, if DDR is to 
contribute to community security and to be sustainable in the long-term, reconciliation has to be taken 
into account.  
 
After discussing the experiences with DDR in Burundi, the report focuses on local security. DDR is 
expected to have significant consequences for local security. At the same time, improved security at 
the local level is a key prerequisite for successful DDR. Both ex-combatants and other community 
members interviewed considered security to be a very broad concept, ranging from the absence of 
theft and violence to security within the family and the ability to work and eat. While security has 
improved in comparison to the violent past, insecurity remains common. It is mostly related to crime, 
such as theft and armed robberies, violence related to land conflicts, and violence related to politics. 
Statutory security actors are often incapable to provide for the security needs of communities. The 
police is under-equipped and ill-trained and corruption in the judicial system is rampant. At times the 
police has appeared to be under the tutelage of political elites or been known to side with criminals. In 
many parts of the country, people do not contact the police directly, but through local state 
functionaries, such as the chef de colline or chef de zone. This hinders more positive working relations 
between the police and communities. Part of the problems is also the fact that people are not always 
familiar with the structure of security provision by the state and who to turn to in case of particular 
security problems. Misunderstanding about the motivations and decisions of state security actors 
further increases perceptions of their corruption and their unwillingness to provide security. Another 
issue hampering the relationship between the police and communities is its history of being an 
oppressive force, first of the colonial powers and later of the ruling Burundian elites. This, however, 
has dramatically improved in many parts of the country. Nevertheless, due to the police’s incapacities 
to provide security the first reaction of communities is still to manage security issues themselves. This 
is done through organizing neighborhood patrols, which sometimes escalate in mob violence. In other 
instances, initiatives are more peaceful, for instance local Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
that set out to resolve local security problems through dialogue. However, it remains problematic that 
such latter initiatives lack legal grounds. Also the local institution of the Bashingantahe, once 
important in maintaining peace in the communities, has eroded over time and has lost legitimacy in 
the eyes of the population. Nonetheless, as the state judicial system is operating poorly, it may still 
have a role to play in contributing to community security in Burundi. Although their current influence 
differs per region, in many places the Bashingantahe are seen to represent well-respected traditional 
values of Burundian society.  
 
Another issue affecting community security is the number of firearms in circulation. Although 
estimated numbers are contestable, it is clear that a large number of civilians continue to have access 
to firearms. Complete civilian disarmament is unlikely to be achieved within the current political 
climate and with a security apparatus incapable of providing the security desired by the people. 
Nevertheless, people emphasized the importance of civil disarmament, and pointed out how past 
civilian disarmament efforts have positively contributed to security. Efforts to limit the number of 
Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) should therefore continue. 
 
When assessing the overall contribution of DDR to community security, regarding disarmament it 
should be said that while there were relative improvements the overall impact of disarmament efforts 
in Burundi has been limited. With regard to demobilization, political tensions in the electoral period 
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have obstructed the dissolution of former military ties. And while reintegration appears to be 
successful at first sight – i.e. people seem to live together in relative peace – failing economic 
reintegration fuels stigmatization while violence and crimes committed by ex-combatants during the 
war remain an unresolved issue. At the same time, the DDR programme did indeed also contribute to 
security in Burundi. The cohabitation trainings have been well-received. And though it has been 
problematic in many cases, reintegration support has facilitated the return of many ex-combatants. 
The effectiveness of the DDR programme in contributing to community security is also highly 
dependent on the context: the year in which fighting has ended, the extent to which property has been 
destructed, and the degree of trauma caused by the war in a particular region. Important is also the 
role of local authorities: by facilitating dialogue between ex-combatants and the community 
reintegration problems can be overcome. Finally, the presence of local organizations involved in 
sensitization efforts has had a positive impact.   
 
Based on the analysis of perceptions and experiences of the actors involved in DDR in Burundi, 
especially ex-combatants and communities, the report concludes with a series of recommendations. 
Considering that there is a large discrepancy between ex-combatants’ expectations and experiences, 
expectation management and improved communication is required. As economic reintegration is vital 
for social reintegration, it should receive more serious attention, for instance in the form of vocational 
training efforts and follow-up. Social reintegration has to be promoted and more attention should be 
given to the sensitization of ex-combatants and receiving communities, before and after ex-combatants 
return in the communities. In this regard, involvement of local NGOs and church-based organizations 
has proven to be very valuable – e.g. through providing forums for dialogue between ex-combatants 
and community members – and their involvement in the DDR process should be stimulated. 
Reconciliation also proved to be an important element for successful social reintegration and should 
be given more attention. One must be careful to derive inferences from the fact that people live 
together in relative peace. If reconciliation is not undertaken or cannot be undertaken in the 
immediate post-conflict context, it should be realized that the success of social reintegration will 
remain limited. At the same time, those responsible for planning DDR programmes should be very 
careful to assume that DDR indeed contributes to reconciliation. Although complete civilian 
disarmament is highly unlikely to result from current short-term efforts, efforts to promote civilian 
disarmament should continue. Finally, our findings on DDR also have an important implication for 
future efforts for SSR. As it turned out, in many communities the relationship with the police is 
problematic. Even if a core objective of SSR is to improve police capacities through training and 
resources, this will not be effective if not accompanied by efforts to improve relationships between the 
police and local communities. 
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1. Introduction 
 
“We, the youth, have destroyed a lot during the conflict,  
but we now have the chance to rebuild the country again.”
1
 
 
“It is just like we are in the bush now because we have no means.”
2
 
 
 
This report is the result of ten weeks of field research in Burundi under the auspices of the working 
group on Community Security and Community-Based DDR in Fragile States of the Dutch Peace, 
Security, and Development Network. This network constitutes a partnership between the Dutch 
government, civil society and universities. The Dutch partners involved in this working group are: the 
Centre for Conflict Studies of Utrecht University (CCS), IKV Pax Christi, the Centre for International 
Conflict Analysis and Management (CICAM) of the Radboud University Nijmegen, the Conflict 
Research Unit of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ (CRU), the 
European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP), PSO (Capacity Building in Developing Countries) 
and Dutch Council for Refugees, and the Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence. The 
fieldwork in Burundi has been carried out by CCS and CICAM. 
 
The working group was established after the signing of the Millennium Accords in June 2007. The 
objective is to contribute to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals in fragile states. 
Several cross cutting themes were identified and working groups were formed along these themes. 
The mission statement of this particular working group is “to understand the context-specific 
dynamics of community-based security and DDR programmes and contribute to adequate policies, 
strategies and programmes for effective design, implementation and coordination of community-
based security and DDR in post-conflict countries.”3 As a result, the working group has three main 
objectives. First, it aims to examine the current state of affairs with regard to DDR policies and 
programs, both initiated from “above” by (inter)state actors and from “below” by grassroots 
initiatives as well as local populations themselves. Second, it investigates the feasibility of a context-
specific approach for community-based DDR. Finally, the working group wants to share and 
disseminate the results of its research as widely as possible.  
 
Before the start of the field research phase, the working group has published a desk study4, to 
investigate the current state of affairs with regard to DDR, and identify issues and questions for the 
field research. Key findings from this desk study were that internationally supported national DDR 
programmes tend to take a very top-down approach. There is often little time, nor inclination, for 
participatory approaches, resulting in limited involvement of local communities in DDR programmes, 
and disregard of the particularities of local situations. Moreover, such national DDR programmes tend 
to be designed to promote national security. Consequently, they fail to ensure the human security of 
the ex-combatants, as well as that of the local population. Yet, local security turns out to be a key 
prerequisite for assuring successful DDR. For instance, only if people feel secure they might be willing 
to hand in their weapons. At the same time, due to their top-down approach and focus on national 
                                                           
1
 Ex-combatant, Kinama, Bujumbura Mairie, 14 April 2010 
2
 Ex-combatant, Muramvya, Muramvya, 28 April 2010 
3
 See PSDN website: www.clingendael.nl/psdn 
4
 Willems et al. (2009) Security Promotion in Fragile States: Can Local Meet National?  
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security, DDR programmes miss opportunities at community level that might effectively contribute to 
peace and security. Literature shows that people tend to organize themselves for their own security, 
but such local security mechanisms are seldom taken into account into DDR programmes. A key 
challenge to DDR programmes rising from this desk study is thus how to better take account of 
community security and local security mechanisms. 
 
The current case study aims to identify practical ways to connect community security with DDR 
programs. In order to achieve this objective, the field research identified:  
 
• local security perceptions and the diverse ways in which communities organize their own 
security; 
• local experiences with national DDR programmes and related donor interventions, and in 
what ways they impact local security and community security mechanisms; 
• actual and possible linkages between national DDR programs and community security 
mechanisms and institutions.  
 
As the experience was that many policy documents on DDR are mainly written from the perspective 
of international donors and implementing agencies, in the case studies it was deliberately chosen to 
focus on the perceptions and lived experiences of local communities with DDR.  
  
Field research has now been completed in Eastern DR Congo and Burundi and further research is 
planned in Colombia and South-Sudan. The current report on the Burundi case argues that despite the 
very limited support received from the DDR program, the return of ex-combatants to the community 
has not been problematic in every community. Social reintegration has been fostered in those 
communities where reunions have taken place between ex-combatants, community-members, local 
administrators and police officers. Such reunions have promoted a degree of trust and have been 
instrumental as a confidence-building measure in the first period after return. However, such gains 
can be easily undone if economic reintegration does not follow suit. When ex-combatants remain 
impoverished they may resort to criminal lifestyles because it is more lucrative. Currently this is the 
case in some communities where ex-combatants commit banditry, theft and paid killings. And in 
regions where ex-combatants are less involved in criminal activities, many communities nevertheless 
believe they are. This also points to the role of stigmatization of ex-combatants, which is another factor 
hampering the reintegration process. This is further aggravated by the fact that ex-combatants possess 
few vocational skills and find it hard to return to productive life. Against this background is also the 
sentiment that in a generalized environment of poverty, favouring ex-combatants by specifically 
targeting them through DDR programs is not appreciated by local communities who also suffer from 
a lack of job opportunity. Moreover, under the surface the past violence inflicted by ex-combatants 
remains a potential spoiler for proper social reintegration. 
 
Therefore, community security is fragile and easily reversible, and the progress made in terms of 
social reintegration must be strengthened by economic reintegration. Crimes such as banditry, armed 
robberies, theft, murder and harassment continue to put community security at risk. Combating crime 
is an arduous task due to weak law enforcement and a poorly functioning judicial system. Corruption 
is said to be endemic at the expense of a fair, swift and impartial application of the law. The police is 
not much trusted and is said to be often late on the crime scene. It does not necessarily protect the 
people, but rather works for personal and political interests. In addition, the police is not necessarily 
regarded as the default security provider by Burundians. Traditionally, local leaders, such as the 
village chief (chef de colline), village administrators and elderly (Bashingantahe) have fulfilled this role 
by mediating disputes and dispensing justice. There remains a tendency to regard the police with 
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suspicion and there is not much faith in the police ability to protect against insecurity. Because of their 
low pay and abusive behaviour they rather contribute to insecurity.   
 
This argument is made as follows. First, in chapter 1, a short conflict history of Burundi is given, 
providing in particular some background on local security, and an introduction of DDR programmes 
in Burundi. This is followed by a discussion of local experiences with DDR programmes, analyzing 
the impact of its different components, and analyzing the local perceptions of such programmes. In 
chapter 4 the analysis focuses on the economic side of reintegration, and chapter 5 investigates the 
social aspects of reintegration. Then, the focus turns to community security. In chapter 6 it is explored 
how local actors understand (in)security, and chapter 7 looks at what actors and mechanisms related 
to security exist at the local level. We will also explore the topic of civilian disarmament, as this is a 
key component of community security. Here, we also discuss how DDR programmes impact on local 
security. The conclusions then relate the issues discussed to practical recommendations. Some of our 
findings suggest that: 
 
• There is a large discrepancy between ex-combatants’ expectations and experiences. 
Expectation management and improved communication is required, even though a certain 
tension between what is expected and what a programme delivers is unavoidable. 
• Economic reintegration is vital for social reintegration and should be given more serious 
attention through vocational training efforts and follow-up. 
• To promote social reintegration, more attention should be given to the sensitization of ex-
combatants and receiving communities, before and after ex-combatants resettle. 
• Local NGOs and church-based organizations have proven to be successful – e.g. by providing 
forums for dialogue between ex-combatants and community members – and their 
involvement should be stimulated. 
• Reconciliation proved to be an important element for successful social reintegration and 
should be given more attention. One must be careful to derive inferences from the fact that 
people live together in relative peace and those responsible for planning DDR programmes 
should be very careful to assume that DDR indeed contributes to reconciliation If 
reconciliation is not undertaken or cannot be undertaken in the immediate post-conflict 
context, it should be realized that the success of social reintegration will remain limited. 
• Efforts to promote civilian disarmament should continue and remain aware of, the obstacles 
that are hampering disarmament (i.e. the reasons people choose to remain armed). 
• With regard to SSR it is important to keep in mind the relationship communities currently 
have with the police. While the improvement of police capacities with training and resources 
is important, more attention should be given to the improvement of the relationship between 
the police and local communities. 
 
Methodology 
The data for this report have been retrieved during eight weeks of fieldwork throughout Burundi 
between 12 April and 4 June 2010. In total we conducted 50 focus group discussions in 26 different 
communities (see annex 4 for a map indicating the communities visited). Our visits lasted typically for 
half a day, during which we held two group discussions: one with about ten ex-combatants and 
another with ten members of the same community. In this way we could take account of security 
perceptions and DDR experiences of both ex-combatants and community members, triangulate 
findings, and ensure that people from both groups felt at liberty to speak. In total we have talked to 
246 ex-combatants and 203 community members, including 341 men and 113 women. In total we 
interviewed 79 ex-combatants of the Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie – Forces pour la 
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Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD), 79 ex-combatants of the Forces Nationales de Liberation (FNL), 69 
ex-members of the Forces Armées Burundaises (FAB – the former national army), 8 ex-members of 
community militias – so-called Gardiens de la Paix – 6 ex-combatants of the Front de Liberation Nationale 
(FROLINA), and 5 ex-members of the CNDD-Nyangoma, a split off from the CNDD-FDD. In 
addition, we have conducted 11 separate individual interviews with community members to verify 
group data. These included 4 male community members, 5 male ex-combatants and 2 female ex-
combatants; 1 from FAB, 2 from FNL and 4 from CNDD-FDD. Further, we have held 33 interviews 
with key informants, including representatives from the Burundian government, intergovernmental 
actors, NGOs, and civil society representatives (see Annex 2 for an overview of key informants).  
 
Our research was carried out during the electoral period in Burundi. On May 24 commune elections 
were held and one week after our departure on June 20 presidential elections were held on June 28. 
There were some instances of violence related to the elections, such as intimidation campaigns by 
political parties’ youth wings. However, it was nevertheless only a week after the commune elections 
that the situation became increasingly tensed and a number of grenade attacks and politically 
motivated killings occurred. During our research, when we asked about what people regarded as 
security and insecurity, people responded in far wider terms than relating their (in)security experience 
solely to insecurity events related to the elections. References were also made to security issues 
relating to the elections and the elections indeed impacted security in Burundi. We nevertheless feel 
that our data have not been biased to an extent it negatively impacts on the internal and external 
validity. During the field research we continuously aimed to identify what issues were specific to this 
election period. On the other hand, while tensions may have been raised by the elections, many 
security issues – including political ones – are characteristic for the post-conflict context. 
 
Throughout the report, we have included quotations. We have included them to provide the reader 
with a sense of how people expressed themselves on the topics we discussed, and to enliven and 
illustrate our analysis. Unless stated otherwise we have consistently tried to select those quotations 
that recurred in other wordings in more than one interview, rather than those representing the 
perspective of particular individuals. As such, these quotations are used to illustrate the story of our 
analysis. The quotations at the beginning of the chapters, however, are sometimes chosen precisely 
because they provide a provocative perspective on the topic. 
 
Moreover, while the report touches on the intentions and the effects of programmes, we are particularly 
interested in the experiences and perceptions of people affected by the DDR programme. In many 
instances, there were differences between what programmes intended to achieve, and how 
programmes were perceived in the communities. This does not necessarily mean that those 
programmes did not realize what they intended. The actual actions undertaken as part of the DDR 
programme and recipient perceptions thereof may be close, but are not the same. On the basis of those 
perceptions we can thus not draw conclusions on what programmes actually did. Yet, they provide 
important insights on how programmes are experienced, which have true consequences in terms of 
people’s apprehension of, and finally, satisfaction about those programmes.  
 
In our research we have worked together with three different local NGOs. We have visited eight 
different communities together with the Centre d’Encadrement et de Développement Des Anciens 
Combattants (CEDAC) in Bujumbura Rurale and Muramvya provinces. MIPAREC from Gitega 
assisted us in our visits to ten communities in Gitega, Ruyigi, Muyinga, Mwaro, and Ngozi provinces. 
Finally CED-Caritas facilitated our research in the provinces of Bururi, Bubanza and Cibitoke where 
we visited six different communities.  
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In the last two weeks of our field research, between 7 and 19 June, we returned to Mutimbuzi, Kabezi, 
Itaba and Kibimba communities, where we organized focus group discussions to present our findings 
to local stakeholders and verify them. In addition, we organized two workshops with Burundian 
NGOs – one in Gitega and one in Bujumbura – and hosted a separate workshop with international 
NGOs operating in Burundi. Finally, we presented our findings to and discussed them with donors 
and international organizations (see annex 3 for details on those verification sessions) . 
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2. Background of the Conflict in Burundi 
 
“People are tired of war, but politicians keep trying to use conflict for political ends.”
5
  
 
“In the past it was war and now it is politics that influences the people.”
6
   
 
 
The reintegration of former combatants into their home communities in Burundi takes place in a 
delicate transitional period from war to peace. While the country has come a long way from the 
rampant instability over the 1990s, and while all rebel movements have now laid down their weapons, 
the contested communal elections of 24 May 2010 – the second since the end of civil war – underscore 
the continuing political instability in the country. Stability at the local level is further affected by the 
return of hundreds of thousands of refugees from neighboring countries, and internally displaced 
people to their home communities. With the political climate in Burundi becoming more stable in the 
new millennium, about 500,000 refugees and numerous internally displaced people have returned 
home.7 The civil war left the country in a situation of enduring poverty. Due to extreme poverty and 
the high number of small arms in civilian hands, criminality remains high. 
 
Since independence in 1962 the country has been plagued by ethnic tensions between the dominant 
Tutsi minority and the Hutu majority.8 Like Rwanda, which was also colonized by the Germans and 
since 1916 under Belgian tutelage, there were tensions between those groups preceding colonization. 
However, during the colonial period more dynamic relations between these two groups became 
frozen and antagonism was fuelled. The Belgian colonizers relied on the Tutsi minority to rule the 
Hutu majority. They coated this arrangement in dubious myths of ‘racial superiority’ and a 
‘traditional domination’ of the Tutsi over the Hutu, transforming the organization of society to reflect 
these myths.9 Yet, the situation in Burundi was rather different from that in Rwanda, where the 1959 
‘Social Revolution’ brought power to the Hutu majority. In Burundi, power was in hands of princely 
lineages, the so-called Baganwa, who had managed to transcend ethnic difference to a certain extent. 
Decolonization in Burundi was less abrupt than in Rwanda and initially did not affect the monarchy. 
Yet, after the death of prime minister and prince Louis Rwagasore, ethnic polarization sharpened, due 
to the demonstration effect from the Rwanda ‘Social Revolution’, increasingly ethnicized power 
struggles within the single ruling party UPRONA, and a Tutsi-led coup within the army. Since then, 
Tutsi minority rule has continued almost uninterrupted. Three military regimes have been in power 
successively, and the army became a bastion of Tutsi power. Emerging rebellion met with harsh 
retaliations from the army, leading to major bloodshed and large outfluxes of Hutu refugees in 1965, 
1972, 1988 and 1991.  
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 In the peak-year 2000, the UNHCR estimated the number of Burundian refugees at about 570,000, of which 
the majority were living in Tanzania (UNHCR 2005: 277). In 2010, there were still 94,000 refugees residing 
abroad (UNHCR 2010). Civil war violence further resulted in massive internal displacement, with about half a 
million displaced people halfway the 1990s (UNHCR 2005: 277). Currently, UNHCR estimates that 100,000 
people have not yet returned to their communities of origin (UNHCR 2010). 
8
 Apart from these two groups, there is the minority ethnic group of the Twa, comprising about 1% of the 
population. Their role in the history and present politics is not included in this report. 
9
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When the Third Wave of Democratization rolled over Africa, a new constitution providing for 
multiparty democracy was adopted, and military rule came to an end. The first democratic multi-
party elections in 1993 were won by Melchior Ndadaye’s FRODEBU, a pro-Hutu party. Tragically, the 
assassination of Ndadaye by Tutsi soldiers led to revenge killings by FRODEBU members, and a 
spiral of Tutsi massacres and army reprisals began. The civil war that ensued has probably cost some 
300,000 lives. In the central parts of the country the population got ethnically segregated, with Tutsi 
fleeing to displacement camps around the communal offices, while whole neighbourhoods of the 
capital Bujumbura became mono-ethnic. Part of the political leaders from FRODEBU fled to the 
exterior and formed the CNDD, with the FDD as its armed wing, which started attacks on Burundian 
soil. Another major rebel movement was the Palipehutu-FNL, the armed wing of the political party 
Palipehutu, established in the 1980s in the Tanzanian refugee camps. While Palipehutu-FNL had its 
support mainly in the central region of Muramvya and along Lake Tanganyika, CNDD was mainly 
supported in the southern regions of Bururi and Ruyigi. Both movements experienced factional 
infighting and schism. 
 
In response to the unrest, former military ruler Buyoya staged a coup in 1996, thereby suspending the 
constitution and effectively ending democracy. The coup led to an international boycott that further 
crippled Burundi’s economy. Since 1998 a careful transition towards peace was initiated by Buyoya, 
who installed a government with more representatives from the Hutu. After failed talks under the 
leadership of former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, in 2001, Nelson Mandela managed to 
negotiate a transitional government, in which Hutu and Tutsi leaders would share power. President 
Buyoya took up the presidency for the first half of the interim period, after which Domitien 
Ndayizeye took over. Minister posts in this period were divided equally among the two ethnicities. 
Yet, the main Hutu rebel groups CNDD-FDD and the Palipehutu-FNL refused to sign the ceasefire 
and fighting continued, including a major rebel assault on Bujumbura in July 2003, and an attack on 
Gatumba transit camp, in which 150 Banyamulenge from the DRC were killed and for which FNL 
claimed responsibility. Only towards the end of 2003, an agreement was reached between the 
government and the CNDD-FDD. FDD leader Pierre Nkurunziza and other FDD members got some 
ministerial posts. In 2004, a UN peacekeeping force took over from African Union troops and a 
disarmament and demobilization programme started. A new national army was to be formed, 
incorporating former government soldiers as well as former fighters of the CNDD-FDD.  
 
In 2005, in the first democratic elections since the civil war, the CNDD-FDD won parliamentary 
elections, and Nkurunziza was elected president. Most minister posts came in hands of CNDD-FDD, 
though FRODEBU and UPRONA also became part of the government. The installation of Nkurunziza 
implied an end to the transitional period. Nkurunziza promoted a policy of unity and reconciliation, 
and hoped to encourage the return of refugees from exile. He also took on a reconciliatory stance 
towards the FNL, and in the end of 2006, a ceasefire was signed with the government. The truce had to 
overcome several hurdles, including clashes between rival FNL factions in Bujumbura and raids in the 
north-west of the country, until end 2008, when a peace agreement was signed. A political hurdle was 
also the change of name of the movement (the name Palipehutu-FNL was against the constitution as it 
emphasized ethnic background) and the liberation of political prisoners and prisoners of war. FNL 
leadership returned from exile in Tanzania and the movement was officially transformed into a 
political party. Since mid-2008, no large security incidents have taken place anymore. In January 2009, 
civil war was officially declared to be ended.  
 
Nkurunziza’s government faces enormous tasks in a country that is in economic debris, and 
continuing political disunity and instability. Nkurunziza’s government has been accused of becoming 
more and more authoritarian (ICG: 2006).  Early 2007, a political crisis emerged, when the former head 
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of the governing party, Hussein Radjabu, was accused of plotting armed rebellion and insulting 
President Nkurunziza, and was put in prison. For most of 2007, parliament was paralyzed as a result 
of a boycott by the main opposition parties and a faction of the CNDD-FDD. Nkurunziza consolidated 
his power by replacing Radjabu’s supporters in parliament by his own. Civil organizations and the 
international community got increasingly concerned about political and civil liberties in Burundi. In 3 
November 2008, Alexis Sinduhije, former journalist of Radio Publique Africaine (RPA) and leader of 
the newly to be established political party Mouvement pour la Solidarité et la Démocratie (MSD) was 
arrested and detained. In June 2010, presidential elections were held. Yet, President Nkurunziza was 
the only candidate after all the opposition candidates pulled out complaining of fraud in the 
communal elections. 
 
At the local level, many Burundians live in a precarious situation. People in the countryside are 
predominantly dependent on agriculture for making a living (Sabimbona, 1998: 3; Oketch and Polzer, 
2002: 120; Kamungi et al., 2004: 1). In one of the most populous countries of Africa,10 land is 
increasingly becoming scarce.11 Land conflicts have multiplied exponentially. More than 80% of 
conflicts that arrive before the tribunals are related to land. There is a large diversity in land conflicts, 
ranging from those resulting from the division of the family inheritance and border disputes, to 
conflicts related to the occupation of land by displaced people, conflicts resulting from development 
programmes in the 1980s which resulted in a thorough reshuffling of properties, or conflicts resulting 
from land grabbing by government representatives and army officials during the civil war (Van 
Leeuwen, 2010). Often, the return of the refugees and the reclamation of their land, which in the 
meantime has been occupied by others, is considered a core risk for the maintenance of the fragile 
peace. Events in 1993 had shown that reinstalling refugees was a politically sensitive issue. One of the 
triggers of the violence and ensuing civil war was the expected massive return of Hutu refugees and 
their land reclamation (Oketch and Polzer, 2002; ICG, 2003). Yet, land conflicts are not just a 
temporary problem related to returnees, it is not a short-term, war-related problem, but a long-term 
issue. In fact, most serious land disputes seem to take place within families, rather than between 
different ethnic groups (Van Leeuwen, 2010; CARE et al., 2004:30-1).  
 
Dealing with those disputes is difficult. Despite the existence of a Land Tenure Code, land holdings 
remain largely unregistered (less than five per cent) (Kamungi & Oketch 2004), while the legitimacy of 
title deeds has been undermined by corrupt practices and nepotism in the Ministry of Lands. Many 
instances exist in which two titles exist for the same plot of land. While the Arusha agreement has 
called for a revision of the Land Code, this is still in process. Further, the judicial system appears not 
equipped to deal with the task placed upon it, due to corruption, limited juridical expertise of the 
magistrates at the tribunals, lack of coordination between government institutes involved in the issue, 
and incompleteness and contradictions in legislation (Dexter, 2005). 
 
Other issues affecting security at the local level are the criminality related to the high number of small 
arms, and continued fear and distrust, in particular in those communities where violence had strong 
ethnic dimensions. Distrust is still a reason for the continued existence of displacement sites. Finally, 
the civil war left the country in a situation of enduring poverty. Burundi experiences high levels of 
food insecurity (WFP, 2010). According to WFP figures, only 28 percent of the population is food-
secure and half of the population is chronically malnourished. Food security is threatened by 
population displacement, poor infrastructure and insecurity, loss of soil productivity and plant 
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diseases. Erratic rainfall has resulted in drought and famines in the north, while climatic changes are 
blamed for large-scale flooding in 2007 and 2009. Agricultural extension services are only slowly 
recovering since the war. 
 
To conclude with, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants in Burundi takes 
place under dire circumstances. Continuing political instability, a difficult transition to a more 
inclusive and democratic system, but also the return of large numbers of refugees and displaced, the 
massive occurrence of land disputes, continuing insecurity and systematic poverty at the local level 
pose a challenging environment for programmes addressing ex-combatants and recipient 
communities   
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3. Background of DDR in Burundi 
 
“Communities are not well prepared for the reintegration of ex-combatants,  
and neither are the ex-combatants themselves.”
12
 
 
“We don’t usually assess reintegration because it is difficult to measure,  
as this is something in the long term. We assess after one or two years at most.”
13
 
 
 
In August 2000 the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreements were signed, which required among 
other conditions: the formation of the new Forces des Défenses Nationales de Burundi (FDNB), a police 
force, and the disarmament and demobilization of those who were not eligible14 to join these new 
forces. Preparations for the DDR programme started immediately and were organized under the 
umbrella of the Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP).15 The new 
security forces were to be established according to the principle of 50/50 ethnic representation, which 
meant the demobilization of a large part of the FAB to make room for members of the Armed Political 
Parties and Movements (APPMs). The Arusha requirements also included the formation of the Police 
Nationale du Burundi (PNB), which now for 89 percent consists of  former military and paramilitary 
forces, of which about half are former rebel combatants (CIGI, 2009: 5). The target was to create an 
army and police force of 25,000 and 15,000 respectively. 
 
In January 2003 the transitional government started with the design of a national DDR plan with 
support of the World Bank, and in August 2003 the Commission National de Démobilisation, Réinsertion et 
Réintégration (CNDRR) was established. The programme was officially launched on 2 December 2004. 
The CNDRR set up an office in each of Burundi’s 17 provinces and used an ex-combatant as a focal 
point in each of the country’s 117 communes. The focal points were elected by the ex-combatants in 
their respective communes, and had caseloads of 30 up to 500 ex-combatants they had to represent, 
depending on the number of ex-combatants in their commune. They were elected for a term of one 
year and received a stipend to cover logistical and communication costs and were given a bicycle 
(Douma and Gasana, 2008: 17). The CNDRR was responsible for the overall programme coordination, 
the Joint Cease-fire Commission (JCC) was in charge of monitoring the process, the United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF) was in charge of attending to child soldiers, and Bureau Intégré des Nations 
Unies au Burundi (BINUB) assisted with the implementation of the DDR programme, with the 
cooperation of the African Union and the World Bank.  
 
The disarmament and registration was the responsibility of the government and supported by BINUB, 
and the JCC, while the CNDRR was charged with registration of combatants after disarmament. The 
disarmament of former FAB members fell under the responsibility of the government. Once people 
volunteered or were selected for demobilization, they were disarmed in their barracks and 
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transported to the demobilization centre where their status was formally changed to civilian. This 
process was implemented by the CNDRR and supported by the MDRP, BINUB and UNICEF. During 
their stay in the demobilization camp ex-combatants received a training, and when discharged from 
the camp they received a reinsertion package (Indemnité Transitoire de Subsistance – ITS), which 
equalled 18 months of salary and consisted of a minimum total amount of 566,00016 fbu, depending on 
military rank. This reinsertion package was paid in instalments. The first installment was paid in cash 
at the demobilization centre, while the remainders of 3 instalments were paid through the banking 
system in their community of choice over a 10-month period (Boshoff and Vrey, 2006: 22). After this, 
demobilized combatants had five options with regard to their reintegration support: 1) return to their 
former employment situation (re-employment); 2) go back to formal education at school; 3) engage in 
vocational training; 4) receive entrepreneurial support; or 5) receive Income-Generating Activities 
support (Activités Génératrices de Revenus – AGR). The large majority opted for the last, which included 
goods of their choice (e.g food items for trade, animals, equipment, etc.) with a value of 600.000 fbu 
and some information on how to set up a project with this whilst at the demobilization site (Douma 
and Gasana, 2008: 6). 
 
The first DDR process was undertaken from 2004 to 2008 and was to demobilize a total of about 78,000 
ex-combatants. This number consisted of: 41,000 effectives from the Burundian Armed Forces; 15,500 
combatants from different APPMs, such as CNDD-Nyangoma, CNDD-FDD-Jean Bosco, CNDD-FDD-
Nkurunziza, Palipehutu-FNL, Palipehutu-FNL-Mugarabona and Frolina; and 21,400 militias from 
groups Gardiens de la Paix (11,733) and Combattants Militants17 (9,668) (Escola de Cultura de Pau, 2008 : 
4). The Palipehutu-FNL (although included in the abovementioned numbers) remained the only party 
in conflict with the government and did not participate in this programme. When the programme 
closed in December 2008, 23,022 adults were demobilized, all of which received reinsertion support 
and 21,966 received reintegration support, and 18,709 Gardiens de la Paix received reinsertion support 
called “allocations de reconnaissance de service.” Also, 3,261 children were released from armed groups, 
of which 3,017 received reinsertion and 2,590 also received reintegration support, and 1,195 ex-
combatants received socio-economic reintegration support (MDRP, 2008). The estimated costs of the 
programme are 84.4 million dollars, which amounts to an average cost of 1,325 per person, excluding 
the costs for disarmament (Escola de Cultura de Pau, 2008: 5).  
 
A second programme started in 2009 and focused on the combatants of the Palipehutu-FNL of 
Agathon Rwasa, the last active rebel group who signed a cease-fire agreement with the government in 
2006 and laid down its weapons in 2008. This programme also included a small number of ex-
combatants from the previous programme, and is to be completed in 2011. From the FNL 2,100 
combatants were to be reintegrated into the army, 1,400 into the police, and 5,000 were to enter the 
national DRR programme under the same definitions of who was considered a combatant as in the 
previous programme. Yet, a special category of Adultes Associés was created to deal with the large 
number of people associated with the FNL who had not been combatants. Compared to other armed 
groups in Burundi the FNL used more guerrilla tactics and support of civilians. These civilians often 
did not partake in direct combat, but supported with transport, food, housing, etc. This group 
consisted of 11,000 people, of which 1,000 are women. After registration this group received 50,000 
fbu, a small reinsertion kit consisting of some clothing and house supplies, and transport back to the 
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community of origin. After a few months they received another 50,000 fbu and could register for a 
UNDP development project. These Traveaux à Haute Intensité de Main d’Œuvre (HIMO) projects are 
aimed at the reconstruction of community infrastructure and include 70% Adultes Associés and 30% 
community members. The projects are based on the Plan Communal de Développement Communautaire 
(PCDC), a community development plan which is written by the Comité Communal de Développement 
Communautaire (CCDC). The members of this local committee are not directly chosen by the people in 
the commune, but the PCDC is to some extent discussed with the community members. To ensure 
HIMO projects take into account the local development priorities, they are chosen from the list in this 
PCDC but choices are limited to those fitting the HIMO profile.18 Although intended as a temporary 
solution to keep people busy during the elections instead of bringing about a durable solution, it does 
involve communities more actively than previous DDR efforts – by including 30% community 
members and selecting the projects based on the PCDC. 
 
With regard to SALW in the hands of the civilian population, the Commission de Désarmement Civil et de 
lutte contre la Prolifération des Armes légères (CDCPA) organized a civilian disarmament campaign in 
cooperation with MAG. Trainings were given through which people were taught how to undertake 
sensitization, and the programme provided incentives for weapons to be handed in, such as pieces of 
cloth and bags of cement. The programme was undertaken during a 2 month amnesty period, as the 
possession of SALW by civilians is officially restricted by law. 
 
Summarizing, from the peace agreements of 2000 onwards there have been continuous efforts to 
disarm non-state actors and to support former combatants in the reintegration in civilian life. Below 
the report will take a closer look at how these efforts have been experienced by those who are affected 
by it. 
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4. DDR Experiences on the Ground 
 
“Reintegration keeps failing, but nothing changes.  
I hope that with your research you will be able to change these policies of the World Bank.”
19
  
 
 “My father was murdered in ‘92. Then in ‘93 the crisis started and many people fled to Tanzania.  
There the armed groups were formed and I decided to join them to be able to return to my country.”
20
  
 
 
This chapter explores local experiences with DDR programmes. To properly understand DDR in the 
context of Burundi, motivations for mobilization and demobilization as well as the relations between 
actors involved in DDR are discussed. The chapter then continues with the experiences with DDR and 
looks into how both ex-combatants and other people in the communities perceive such programmes. 
The focus here is mainly on the economic aspects of reintegration, whereas the following chapter 
focuses on the social aspects of reintegration.  
 
A first issue of importance are the motivations ex-combatants had for mobilization and 
demobilization. The primary motivations ex-combatants gave for joining the army, a rebel group or 
militia, were political grievances, such as wanting to fight for an ethnically balanced government and 
army, freedom for Hutus, or fighting for peace stability in the country. As an ex-combatant explained: 
“We wanted democracy but then Ndadaye was killed and the crisis began. People wanted change but 
that was resisted. I joined the CNDD-FDD to protect myself and help to achieve more democracy.”21 
Other important reasons were finding security, to be able to return to Burundi after having fled to 
neighboring countries during the crisis, or to revenge murdered family members. People also said 
they were forced to join. This included people that were directly forced by an armed group to fight or 
support the group with transport, supplies and housing; or people feeling they simply did not have 
another option, given the security situation on their colline, or because an armed group was controlling 
it. Economic motivations were also mentioned, but less frequent, and often by ex-FAB soldiers who 
had joined the army for a career before the start of the crisis. Similar observations on fighter’s 
motivations are made by Uvin (2007), although our findings place less emphasis on economic 
motivations for those who joined the rebel movements. As argued by others, we find that the 
Burundian case proves that political grievances can indeed be more important than economic 
motivations and that in Burundi “the fixation on ‘material opportunity’ rather than grievances would 
be misguided” (Samii, 2007: 3). 
 
That the majority of motivations for mobilization were based on political goals seems to have 
facilitated the process tremendously. A large part of the people who demobilized did so voluntarily. 
Many of them said to be tired of the war and fighting, but more notable, a lot of ex-combatants said to 
have demobilized because the goals that were being fought for were attained.22 “When the CNDD-
FDD had come to power in Bujumbura I found it no longer necessary to be in the CNDD-FDD, so I 
quit to demobilize. After we had reached our goals I thought it was time for me to rest.”23 
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Interestingly, ex-FAB soldiers gave similar reasons for demobilizing: “I saw there were many killings 
and Burundi was in crisis. That’s when I joined the army to bring peace and security to the country. 
Thanks to God that goal has been reached so I demobilized voluntarily.”24 The fact that many ex-
combatants decided to demobilize voluntarily and that the goals for mobilization were supported by a 
large part of the population has eased the process of social reintegration.   
 
Of course not all combatants demobilized voluntarily. Also, rank harmonization in the new national 
army was for some former rebels an extra reason to demobilize, in order to hold on to their old 
military rank. As promotions were given with greater ease in the rebel groups compared to the army, 
many combatants from rebel groups were degraded upon integration into the newly formed army; 
something which proved to be unacceptable for some combatants we interviewed. Part of the ex-
combatants were forced to demobilize, because of the limited number of the rebels who could join the 
new national army or, in case of ex-FAB soldiers, because of age, handicaps caused by the war, or 
insubordination (i.e. the number of ‘faults’ in their record). Yet, for the majority of ex-combatants the 
goals of the war were reached and demobilization was a logical step. And although there were 
economic needs on the side of the ex-combatants, the economic benefits that were promised in the 
DDR programme were not the principal reason for demobilizing. This contrasts with for instance 
eastern DRC, where currently the reasons for mobilization, fighting and demobilization are for the 
majority economic.25 
 
In fact, this implies that in Burundi the role of the DDR programme in enticing people to enter 
demobilization was limited. Giving economic incentives for disarmament and demobilization implies 
that DDR programmes are set up under the assumption that joining demobilization is a rational, 
basically economic, choice. DDR programmes are seen to offer combatants an alternative livelihood 
for fighting, and so they are valued as for significantly reducing the numbers of armed groups. Yet, 
reasons given for demobilization by ex-combatants in Burundi suggest that the economic incentives of 
DDR programmes have a far more limited role in motivating people to demobilize. Rather, ex-
combatants often decided to demobilize because of the political circumstances they had arrived at. 
Consequently, community members do not so much evaluate the DDR programme on the extent to 
which it has motivated demobilization and so contributed to security, but rather on what the 
programme has brought in terms of assistance for economic and social reintegration. It should be 
noted, however, that while ex-combatants did not always mention economic benefits of DDR as a 
motivation for demobilization, they did see economic support as necessary for their reintegration. 
 
A second issue of importance are the relationships between the actors involved in DDR. Notable here 
is the relationship between the Burundian government and the international community. As a 
consequence of the international community’s concern for national ownership, all assistance is 
channelled through the government. In a country that has just emerged from civil war and with a 
government that is considered to be incapable and corrupt this dependence on the national 
government creates problems. On the ground there is little trust in the government and the CNDRR, 
and corruption is seen to be rampant. The replacement of the previous Sécretaire Exécutif of the 
CNDRR in 2008 due to a corruption scandal has not improved the perception of the CNDRR of being 
corrupt. As a result of this not all payments to ex-combatants have been made in full, and what was 
paid endured many delays. “If you give support to the government the money doesn’t end up here 
and only the people up there are profiting.”26 The delayed payments of benefits to ex-combatants by 
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the CNDRR have caused several manifestations by protesting ex-combatants in front of the CNDRR 
office. Apart from corruption, payments have been delayed to the government by the World Bank 
when the programme proposals for DDR handed in by the CNDDR were not yet considered to be in 
order. On the other hand, not all problems can be blamed on corruption and incapacity on the side of 
the Burundian government. One government official explained that because of the bureaucratic 
processes delays are just a fact when you work with the World Bank,27 and another complained that 
“they are not the easiest to work with.”28 Complaints were made that the procedures are excessive and 
time consuming,29 and that “donors are demanding things to go as they propose them while their 
ideas do not always match the realities and needs on the ground.”30 Another problem is that while 
there are many international donors (both multilateral and bilateral) active in reintegration, according 
to a UN official there is no mapping of who does what where.31  
 
In this respect, the situation in Burundi is not a-typical. Many DDR programmes are frustrated by the 
weaknesses of post-civil war governments. Yet, the fact that the DDR programme from the start 
prioritized working with the national government has important consequences for the extent to which 
the programme was also rooted and embedded at the local, sub-national level. Indeed, in the case of 
Burundi, we experienced a lot of frustration about the lack of involvement by some local actors. Ex-
combatants aired their grievances of not being sufficiently implicated in the execution of the 
programme and the way decisions on the programme were made. Despite the system of focal points – 
ex-combatants who represented the ex-combatants in a commune at provincial and national levels – 
and the free choice the programme intended to give ex-combatants on their reintegration kit, many 
felt that the programme was forced upon them.  
 
Demobilized are not being implicated in the programme and we can’t make any choices. They 
should allow us to choose ourselves, but now it is like a dictatorship. We are treated as children, 
and they are like a father who buys pants for his son, but doesn’t care whether it is red or blue. But 
it matters for the child. We should be more involved in the decision making.32  
 
In general, many ex-combatants feel they can play a more active role in the DDR process and support 
the development of the country, but – like other community members – they generally find they need 
to be given material support to enable them to do so. 
 
Similar complaints about being neglected in the programme have been made by community members. 
The focus of the DDR programme was primarily on individual combatants, and the communities in 
which these ex-combatants were to be reintegrated were not involved in the decision of what benefits 
were to be granted. As a representative of an NGO explained, this lack of involvement resulted in 
projects that did not match the context in which it had to be implemented: “Car mechanics was given 
to someone in a region where only the bishop and the governor had a car.”33 Communities were also 
hardly prepared for the arrival of ex-combatants and not supported in receiving them. Yet it was 
observed that “an approach that includes the community is needed because reintegration is much 
easier when the ex-combatants are understood.”34 In some communities local NGOs filled this gap 
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and helped sensitize and prepare communities, yet these organizations often had very limited 
resources and it was not a widespread phenomenon. Communities themselves are very poor, which 
not only hinders the reintegration but can also create more frustrations over the benefits given to ex-
combatants when they are not properly involved. Moreover, other projects have shown that crime 
dropped significantly when different vulnerable groups in a community were put together in 
projects.35 Potentially communities can be much more involved in the identification of projects and 
sensitization efforts. The projects including Adults Associés based on the PCDC community 
development plans as discussed in chapter 3 are a positive step towards more community 
involvement in deciding what projects are implemented where. 
 
With regard to local NGOs again the same grievances were aired. There have been some local NGOs 
involved in the sensitization of communities and ex-combatants and supporting of dialogue, but this 
number has been limited. This is an unexploited source as local NGOs can play a big role in 
supporting the reception of ex-combatants in communities. One local NGO explained their work with 
regard to IDPs, by using local peace committees who sensitize both the receiving community and the 
IDPs in the camp, both before the IDPs actually return. “The main issue of this example is that we 
work at the basis, and that we work from two sides. In the DDR programme people were imposed on 
their communities without sensitization.”36  
 
4.1. DDR Experiences 
Overall, the experiences of ex-combatants with DDR were rather negative because it did not meet 
their expectations. One ex-combatant explains the difficulties: “for me reintegration is finding back 
civilian life. It is getting job training and learning how to live together again. I am traumatized, I have 
no family and I have four children to feed.”37 Many of the complaints had to do with the support that 
had suffered many delays or sometimes was not (or not completely) delivered as promised. This gave 
some ex-combatants the feeling that DDR “was only there to excommunicate [sic.] us from the armed 
groups.”38 Even when all support was given as promised, ex-combatants felt it was very difficult to 
start a life with the benefits they had received. In some cases ex-combatants returned to find their 
houses destroyed and their family killed. Moreover, due to the delays of the payments many ex-
combatants had acquired debts. “We have a lot of debts now because in the transit site they told us to 
borrow money rather than to steal. There was no alternative so the interest rate was very high.”39  
 
Many ex-combatants also complained about the fact that the money was given in a number of 
instalments and that the kit had to contain goods instead of money. They argued that if the sum was 
given at once and in cash, it would have been easier to construct a house or start a business. Another 
problem with the kit was that in the view of ex-combatants they were being cheated by the merchants 
used by DDR programmers to supply their benefits. According to the programme, the kit had to be in 
goods, but could be freely chosen by ex-combatants for a value of 600,000 fbu. In some areas, however, 
merchants used by the DDR programme were believed to have artificially raised the prices on the 
market for the ex-combatants. “They had given us 1 litre of rice for 900 fbu while on the market it was 
only 700 fbu for a litre.”40  
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All these frustrations can potentially cause problems, because it could increase susceptibility on part 
of the ex-combatants to be manipulated by politicians.  “After all the fighting it is hard to go back into 
civilian life. I realise that life was much easier as a combatant. Of course it was hard, but at least I had 
food and could drink whenever I wanted. Now I sometimes think to pick up a weapon again.”41 This 
will be discussed in further detail in chapter 9. 
 
4.1.1. Unrealistic Expectations or Justifiable Complaints? 
What became clear during fieldwork is that there is a large discrepancy between the expectations and 
the experiences ex-combatants had with regard to DDR. To some extent the expectations have been 
unrealistic and were raised by false promises. For instance, Ex-FAB soldiers believed they would 
continue to be entitled to free health care as they were used to while in service, while the government 
rejects such promises were ever made. Nevertheless, many combatants claim officials from the 
ministry of defence and the CNDRR promised them the moon. Also the armed groups spread the 
word that DDR would reward their combatants, in order to inflate the number of their ranks and to 
assure they would be taken serious in the peace negotiations (Nindorera, 2008: 12). Expectations have 
also been raised due to miscommunications and rumors. For instance, at one point the president was 
talking on the radio about benefits that had already been paid, which created the perception that these 
benefits would again be paid out.42 And others claimed the magazine Jeune Afrique had published an 
article talking about a higher amount then was given to them.43 Rumors were also circulating that 
benefits in other countries had been much higher. “They promised a lot but what we got didn’t match 
the hard work we had done. The people in Congo got 6 million fbu when they were reintegrated and 
the demobilized in Rwanda are living in nice houses with water and electricity.”44 And ex-combatants 
also talk to UN peacekeepers and start comparing their DDR benefits with the benefits UN blue 
helmets are entitled to when they return home after having served. Raised expectations over what the 
DDR programme would bring in benefits are thus for a large part caused by the context of mouth-to-
mouth communication in which rumours easily spread. Affected by the ‘radio trottoir’ (i.e. rumors on 
the street) DDR programmes should therefore aim to limit raised expectations but can never prevent 
them. 
 
While on the one hand unrealistic, expectations are on the other hand to a certain extent also 
justifiable. After having spent years in the bush, sometimes having lost their family and land, and 
having to rebuild their lives from nothing, the needs of ex-combatants can indeed be very high. 
Illustrative is a story we came across of ex-combatants that had benefited in the first phase of the first 
DDR programme. Some went as far as cutting off their thumb, hoping they could benefit also from the 
second phase of the programme, where for identification fingerprints were used to determine 
eligibility.45 Whether a true story or not, it does show the needs of ex-combatants were considered to 
be very real. Further, the very name of DDR sets ‘reintegration’ as one of the goals of the programme. 
Consequently, to many community members, the programme raised far going expectations about the 
extent of assistance for the reintegration of ex-combatants in society. Yet, even among those 
responsible for the programme there is no shared understanding of what reintegration exactly should 
entail and what its scope was, and how a programme such as DDR can contribute to this. As one UN 
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official explained: “There are many factors involved in reintegration and we still don’t know how to 
do reintegration.”46 The impact DDR has with regard to reintegration is hardly ever properly assessed, 
and it can be questioned whether reintegration can be achieved through DDR. In effect, the name of 
the DDR programme sets a promise it perhaps cannot keep. And even when, according to a UN 
official commenting on the programme for AA, it was tried “not to make any hard promises,”47 the 
flyer handed out to ex-combatants reads that in the end of the programme there will be “opportunités 
de réintégration socio-économique durable a base communautaire.”48 Yet the Adultes Associés programme 
does not have the funds for this and, as mentioned earlier, only includes a three month job 
opportunity with high intensity labor. Moreover, as one ex-combatant explained, “there is not enough 
talked about the support that is needed for reintegration: things are just given.”49  
 
Another issue is that while the support given to ex-combatants is not insignificant in terms of finances, 
many seem to have trouble to properly use this support for reintegration. As a representative from an 
international NGO explained, “after two weeks, they were supposed to be capable of writing a small 
project, which is something that is even for us here not something easy to do, and we are used to it.”50 
The capacities of ex-combatants have not been taken into account during the planning and 
implementation of the DDR programme. “We, the international community and the Burundian 
government set up the ex-combatants to fail. They didn’t receive any training when they were 
demobilized. We need to change our mental picture of what reintegration actually entails.”51 Based on 
his observations, a representative of a local research institute made the following cynical conclusion: 
 
I think their priority was to decrease the armed forces in order to decrease the security budget. I’m 
not sure, but I think that was the main goal. Reintegration was more of secondary concern. For 
instance, there was one day I was talking with a representative of the World Bank and I told him, 
all this money you are going to give these ex-combatants, they will just use it to buy beers and 
drink if you don’t give them other support. And his reaction was: that doesn’t matter, because if 
they use it for beers, it goes into the local economy and that helps too. I don’t want to make a 
caricature out of them, but I think the only point was to make cuts in the national security budget. 
Not reintegration.52 
 
4.2. Differences in Experience and Context 
It should be emphasized that there are large geographical differences in how DDR is experienced.  
Differences in how DDR was experienced had to do with the particularities of the region to which ex-
combatants returned,53 their personal situation regarding their homes and families, and whether they 
were considered to be part of a vulnerable group and the way this group was treated.  
 
Some communes have become mono-ethnic due to the conflict, which according to some ex-
combatants made it easier for them to reintegrate. “My community was entirely Hutu so it was easy 
for me to reintegrate. The Tutsis in the area did not trust me because I had been in the rebel group for 
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so long.”54 Reintegration seemed also easier when ex-combatants returned to their own communities 
having fought somewhere else, as was for instance the case in Bururi. In contrast, in other regions, like 
in Bujumbura Mairie and surrounding regions in Bujumbura Rurale, rather than returning home to 
their own communities, ex-combatants have settled after the end of the conflict. Here, their 
reintegration is more problematic. Reintegration seemed also more difficult in regions that have seen 
much more violence – such as Bujumbura Rurale, Bubanza and Cibitoke – as compared to other 
regions – such as certain parts of Bururi where hardly any violence had taken place. Around Gitega, 
reintegration was also more difficult. Here, the number of ex-combatants is relatively high due to the 
fact a large transit site was situated there and many ex-combatants stayed after demobilization.  
 
Another major difference influencing reintegration is the distinction between urban and rural regions. 
In the countryside there are less job opportunities, but nevertheless reintegration often failed because 
ex-combatants lacked the basic skills necessary to successfully reintegrate.55 Also, as argued by Uvin 
(2007: 26) the costs of living are lower in rural areas, meaning the reintegration support could be put 
to more use than in urban areas. 
 
Apart from the context in which ex-combatants have to reintegrate, also the personal situation in 
which ex-combatants find themselves is important for the ease and success of reintegration. The 
situation is more difficult for those ex-combatants who for whatever reason could not return to their 
own communities, for those that upon return to their communities find their land lost, their houses 
destroyed and their family killed, and for those whose family members have been displaced. 
Reintegration is easier for those ex-combatants who return to their own houses and have families who 
have been taking care of their land. Clearly, the latter group has les problems to continue their lives 
than the former. 
 
Finally, of great influence for the success of reintegration was the amount of education and working 
experience before joining the army or armed groups. Many ex-FAB soldiers had completed their 
education before joining the army, which greatly improved their chances of finding a job after 
demobilization. “Luckily I have a diploma, otherwise my life would have been a disaster. Others do 
not, therefore they have it much more difficult. And because I was a captain I could not be ignored 
and I received 1,000,000 fbu. Others received less, because the rank-and-file can be ignored.”56 
Generally speaking, ex-combatants from the armed groups joined in an earlier stage of their lives than 
those joining the FAB, and therefore they are relatively disadvantaged. They often have had less 
education before joining the armed groups and have spent their adolescent years fighting. 
 
4.2.1. Different groups, different needs 
For certain groups reintegration can be particularly difficult, such as for children, self-demobilized, 
handicapped and women. Support for child soldiers, steered by UNICEF, has been more thorough 
than the support for adults. Almost all child soldiers have returned to their families, and others have 
been brought to guardians. And whereas with regard to adults the receiving communities were hardly 
prepared for their return, the families or guardians of child soldiers received extensive sensitization 
before (re-)unification. Their families also received financial support to cover costs of schooling and 
social expenditures. Uvin (2007: 30) suggests that “child soldiers have not become social outcasts, 
systematically rejected by their families and communities. There were few reprisals or violent 
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rejections.” And an assessment made for the World Bank suggests that the targeted assistance for 
child soldiers reduced their vulnerability and that they are as well off as, and sometimes even better 
off than, their civilian peers (Tatoui-Cherif 2006: 7). 
 
Nevertheless child soldiers also faced particular difficulties. Having joined at a young age, they often 
lack schooling. Therefore more problematic is also a large group of children that was self-demobilized. 
A representative of a local NGO supporting this particular group explained that a large number of 
children deserted from the armed groups.57 Some left after being confronted with the violence and 
death on the battlefield, and others stayed at home after having been sent there by their commanders 
for medical support. Children are believed to form a large part the deserted combatants. Also, 
children were often left off the lists for DDR by the armed groups, as they realized it was regarded to 
be bad to have many children in their ranks.  
 
Self-demobilized have not received any support, except in some cases from their families. According 
to Uvin (2007: 17), they feel more excluded than others and are more angry than their colleagues who 
have been through DDR. Potentially, therefore, they can also more easily be manipulated by 
politicians. 
 
Another great difference is an ex-combatant’s health condition after demobilization. The estimated 
number of ex-combatants that is handicapped is estimated to be over 4,000 (Uvin, 2007: 26). The 
situation for handicapped ex-combatants is clearly more difficult, and there are many frustrations 
about lacking medical and financial support among them. A government official involved in DDR 
explained that there have indeed been problems between the government and a South African 
organization that was supposed to implement the support for handicapped ex-combatants. At the 
time of writing this report a new organization is to start a new programme.58 
 
Gender sensitivity 
A particular weakness of the first DDR programme was that there was no specific support for women. 
Beforehand, a government official explained, it was not realized that there were also many women 
among the combatants, and in the second programme the reintegration kits for men and women were 
given different contents.59 According to a local NGO supporting women’s rights, most women were 
forced into armed groups and are misunderstood and stigmatized when they returned to their 
communities.60 And also female ex-combatants themselves explained this: “Women sometimes are not 
able to get back to their husband, because they married someone else during the war or because they 
did not want a woman who was in the armed groups so divorced them.”61 “People respond bad to 
women coming from the bush. Especially when she has gotten a child there.”62 Nevertheless, other 
women responded that there were no big differences between the problems of male and female ex-
combatants.63 However, overall it can be said that women do have more problems with regard to 
stigmatization in the community after they return from the bush.64 And Douma and Gasana (2008: 31) 
found that while child mothers and war widows encountered problems with social rejection, other 
female ex-combatants were generally more successful in reintegration than their male counterparts.  
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4.3. Different Needs, Differentiated Support? 
It is clear that the needs of people in Burundi differ greatly. Between ex-combatants and the 
communities who receive them, and between ex-combatants themselves, depending on their personal 
experiences, region of return or particular sub-group. This could be interpreted as a call for more 
differentiated support. As the targeted support for child combatants has shown (Tatoui-Cherif 2006: 
7), this can be rather successful.  
 
Yet, on the other hand, after years of civil war almost everyone in Burundi is in need. As one 
community member explained, “everybody was affected by the war and we are all detached in some 
way. One person does not need more help than the other. When one group of people then receives 
more than another, that is difficult to accept.”65 And as already discussed earlier, the focus on 
individual combatants has caused the receiving communities to be neglected in the DDR programme. 
When talking about differentiated support, there is also the problem of identification. UN officials 
complained that you can hardly tell whether someone is an ex-combatant or just someone who is 
interested in the benefits of the programme.66 And a number of practitioners have also claimed the 
distinction between ex-combatants and unemployed youth is rather artificial in reality.67 In the end, 
they both face the same problems and pose the same potential security risks. Also the distinction 
between ex-combatants and Adultes Associés has proven difficult on the ground, as people had trouble 
understanding it. People classified as Adultes Associés sometimes perceived themselves to be just as 
much FNL as the combatants receiving full DDR support, and felt undervalued.  
 
Moreover, when talking about differentiated support it is almost impossible to identify what the 
priorities are and what reasonable support is, because it all depends on the perspective one takes. For 
instance, ex-combatants and community members who were victimized by them will have different 
ideas about what is reasonable reintegration support. And while in principle programme 
diversification might arguably be necessary, DDR is the result of a political process and agreed upon 
in the peace agreements. Also, differentiated support to ex-combatants still risks reinforcing stigmas 
and create jealousy. As a community representative of a local NGO explained, “support has to be 
geared towards reintegration. I’m afraid that if you just give things to ex-combatants this will not help 
the relationship.”68  
 
4.3.1. Political manipulation of DDR? 
Finally, when discussing DDR and reintegration in the communities, many people interpreted 
differences in success of the programme in political terms, claiming that certain groups have been 
prioritized. In many instances, such assessments have to be related to the ongoing politicization of 
DDR in Burundi. In other instances, they are true to a certain extent.  
 
Some regions are seen to have made more demands than others and would have profited more. 
Support in some regions started earlier than in others, creating feelings of neglect and tensions 
between regions, as a representative of an international development organization explained.69 While 
in the past Bururi, the heartland of the ruling regime at the time, got more development, this can now 
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perhaps be argued for Ngozi and Gitega. According to some, there have also been cases where 
commanders increased the number of combatants under their command by enlisting friends from 
their home region for DDR support. 
 
Ex-combatants of other groups than the CNDD-FDD often complained that they received less support 
than those belonging to the party in power. This complaint was justified to the extent that problems 
between the government and the World Bank did indeed delay payments to FNL ex-combatants. This 
created more frustrations on the side of FNL ex-combatants, and reportedly some have left without 
any support, thinking they would not get anything.70  
 
Much complaints were also registered about the special category of Adultes Associés in the FNL DDR 
programme. This category was thought up during the negotiations with Agathon Rwasa. The CNDD-
FDD complained they never had been given the opportunity of having a special category.71 On the 
other hand, however, this special category of the FNL received less support than other ex-combatants, 
creating confusion and the idea among some FNL ex-combatants that they have received less. But the 
complaints that the CNDD-FDD has moved more support to its own combatants is not a complaint 
made by the Adultes Assiociés of the FNL, but also by ex-combatants from both FNL and other groups.  
 
Finally, there appears indeed to be political manipulation of DDR support, where benefits are 
channelled to those related to the party in power in order to lure people to support it as well. As noted 
by Douma and Gasana (2008: 32), “the NCDDR from the outset was heavily politicized and gradually 
became the ‘bank account’ of the ruling party.” And at the same time other groups are claiming to be 
disadvantaged by the government in order to demand more support. Moreover, ex-combatants have 
taken over this discourse and to some extent use the possibility of them resorting to crime or being 
used by politicians for violence to make claims on support. For example: “They should help me learn 
a trade. Now I’m in a situation where I sometimes think I’ll start stealing. Maybe find some friends 
with guns and form a group to steal.”72 Political patronage is arguably more based on perceptions 
than factual evidence, but the effects of these perceptions are nonetheless very real. Feeling neglected, 
some ex-combatants may decide to keep opposing the ruling party, perhaps violently. On the other 
hand, with the CNDD-FDD firmly in control, others might just as well decide to switch camp in the 
hope to get some benefits. 
 
 
Concluding chapter 4 
Taking all this into account, one must conclude DDR in Burundi has not been successful with regard 
to economic reintegration. A strong assumption behind DDR is that it provides combatants an 
economic alternative for fighting. Yet, what this economic alternative should look like in practice 
varies according to one’s viewpoint. Some view DDR as a programme with short-term security gains 
as the primary goals – implying economic support for ex-combatants is only there to keep them quiet 
during the first steps of the peace process – while others promote DDR to be an integral aspect of 
longer-term development goals. And even those viewing DDR as having only short-term goals 
generally agree that further development, albeit by other programmes than DDR, is required to 
maintain the momentum DDR is thought to provide.  
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Yet in Burundi, in comparison with many other countries in which DDR programmes are taking place, 
economic motivations were relatively less important to the decision of combatants to stop fighting,. A 
large part of the ex-combatants we interviewed left because they considered that they had achieved 
the political aims for which they had initially taken up arms. Nonetheless, while the economic 
opportunities provided by the DDR programme were often no primary motivation for demobilization, 
the way in which the programme affected them economically certainly became more important to ex-
combatants after demobilization. Of course, the dire economic situation of many ex-combatants is a 
given in most post-conflict contexts and DDR is certainly not designed for, nor capable of fully 
addressing that. Indeed, while the economic needs of ex-combatants may be very real, communities as 
a whole live in poverty and have high development needs. But even if we consider DDR to have a 
very limited role only in long-term economic reintegration of ex-combatants, directly or through 
associated programmes, we cannot other than conclude that economic reintegration of ex-combatants 
in Burundi has been highly inadequate. The real needs of ex-combatants were high and rumors and 
miscommunications further raised expectations, and subsequently raised the frustrations of ex-
combatants.  
24 
 
5. Reinsertion, Reintegration or Reconciliation? 
 
“What happens if you give 600,000 fbu for a project to someone  
who is illiterate and who has been in the bush for years?”
73
 
 
“We do not forget. We live peacefully together, but we never forget.”
74
 
 
 
Where the previous chapter focused on the economic side of reintegration, this chapter looks at social 
reintegration. First it starts looking at the extent to which social reintegration has been achieved. While 
at first sight relatively successful, the chapter continues with a more critical viewpoint. Depending on 
what qualifies as successful reintegration, critical remarks can be made on the level of social 
reintegration in Burundi.  
 
5.1. What is ‘Social Reintegration’? 
Among those in charge of the DDR programme, reintegration is defined as “the process by which ex-
combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income,” which “[…] is 
essentially a social and economic process with an open time-frame” (UN IAWG, 2009, 1:10: 2). And a 
Burundian ex-combatant described it as follows: “in the armed group we lived like wild animals. We 
had nothing to eat and drink. Reintegration means to start living like humans again, without violence 
and weapons, but with each other. For me DDR means to support me with that.”75 Both these 
definitions, in their own ways, say reintegration is something long-term, including both economic and 
social reintegration. The debate in the literature, however, is to what extent DDR programmes can 
support this. Is DDR only to support social reintegration to the extent that people can live together in 
relative peace, or should it be deeply connected to efforts to deal with the past violence and grievances 
underlying the latent conflict? As will be discussed, also at the local level in Burundi the ways in 
which reintegration is defined vary, and different priorities for reintegration support are given 
accordingly.  
 
Taking the perspective that reintegration is simply living together, at the surface social reintegration in 
Burundi seems to have been relatively successful. While there were problems of distrust when ex-
combatants had just returned to civilian life, these have dampened over time and cohabitation has 
improved. Similar observations about social reintegration have been made by Uvin (2007:21). In 
addition, Mvukiyehe, Taylor and Samii (2006: 29) found that “only 12% of ex-combatants reported 
problems with family and 22% reported problems with neighbours or community.” Ex-combatants 
and community members claim that this can be attributed to the social cohabitation training given to 
ex-combatants in the transit site. According to many, problems with ex-combatants decreased over 
time, “because of the training they got. Some already put this in practice from the beginning and 
others did not but they helped each other and now they all improved their behavior.”76 The 
relationship often improved when trust was regained and things remained calm. What also helped 
was if local NGOs had prepared the community for the arrival of ex-combatants, and when they 
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assisted the cohabitation by creating platforms for dialogue. “Today the relationship is good but when 
they first came here things were difficult and we were afraid of them. But we got a lot of information 
about living together which helped a lot. And when they came here they also showed they wanted to 
live together and their attitude helped a lot.”77 Similarly, in places where local political leaders took 
more initiatives for dialogue – which they especially did when they had been ex-combatants 
themselves – there were less problems with social reintegration. 
 
Contextual factors have also contributed to a better social reintegration. As discussed earlier, many ex-
combatants said to have had political motivations for joining the army or armed groups and decided 
to demobilize when these goals had been attained. This is in contrast to for instance eastern DRC, 
where many combatants have more economic motivations (Rouw and Willems, 2010). Communities 
also often supported the goals of ‘their’ combatants, which caused less detachment between the 
communities and their ex-combatants. Nevertheless, in various communities social reintegration is not 
a complete success and by some even regarded as superficial. Economic reintegration has in many 
cases been highly problematic, which also causes problems for social reintegration. Moreover, issues 
with regard to violence in the past are often left unaddressed and thus unresolved, which could be 
fertile ground for remobilizing disenchanted youth in the nearby future. The remainder of this chapter 
will take a closer look at these issues and its consequences for the reintegration process in Burundi. 
 
5.2. Needs in Social Reintegration Identified 
During the fourteen days ex-combatants spent in the transit site ex-combatants received training on 
social cohabitation, human rights, HIV/AIDS, and how to handle money and use their kit. The 
question is in what different ways these trainings prepared ex-combatants for their return to their 
communities. The training on social cohabitation was usually positively evaluated, by ex-combatants 
and community members alike. People appreciated the focus on how to deal with conflicts and 
stigma. However, these trainings were nevertheless considered to be insufficient for a return to 
civilian life, as well as too theoretical. Moreover, these trainings differed greatly from one another, and 
while some ex-combatants said they had received a total of two weeks of training, others had only 
received three or four days. “When we were in the bush we were like wild animals. Three days is not 
enough to prepare yourself psychologically for a return to civilian life. Also, you can’t really use your 
kit after so little training.”78 Therefore, although the total sum of the benefits given to ex-combatants 
was rather large, many of them found it difficult to effectively use it for their reintegration because 
they did not have the capacity to handle money. A government representative explained with regard 
to ex-FAB combatants that they had always been fed and clothed by the military. “They have no idea 
where their food comes from; they have never been to the market. And in the army all they ever had 
to use their money for was buying beer, so that is all they buy from their money now. It is a bad habit, 
but it is a sad reality.”79  
 
Vocational training was an option in the programme, yet only a small minority of the ex-combatants 
opted for this (Douma and Gasana: 2008: 27). An ex-combatant explained that the costs of the training 
were extracted from the 600,000 fbu kit.80 On top of that, ex-combatants had themselves to take care of 
costs for housing, food and transport in Bujumbura where the trainings were given. Many complaints 
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were also made about the lack of follow-up, and people felt they were abandoned after having had 
little training. 
 
5.2.1. Stigmatization and Economic Reintegration 
As a result of the lacking training and follow-up many ex-combatants have problems finding a job and 
sufficient financial means. On top of their financial difficulties, ex-combatants are also expected to 
bring home financial gains. “The fact that we fought during the war and came back without any 
support for the community is looked down upon. They expect us to come back from the war with 
something for the community.”81 People also heard about the financial support ex-combatants have 
received, which further raised expectations. When coming back without any benefits for the 
community and lacking capacities to find work and contribute economically, ex-combatants are 
considered futile or even a burden. Moreover, as ex-combatants have received support through DDR, 
in some communities they are excluded from community development projects and related 
employment opportunities. 
 
When NGOs come with projects we are being excluded by the community because they think 
because we had DDR we already have a lot of things. For instance, if the road needs to be repaired 
they don’t ask us for it, but we are very capable of working. That’s why we feel misled. But the 
community and the administrator himself do not accept us in this work.82  
 
The argument for this is that the ex-combatants have already been given support, while the argument 
of ex-combatants is that their benefits are long gone and were intended for reinsertion purposes. 
Arguably the government should take more action to include all groups within the community. 
Indeed, where the chef or administrateur were ex-combatants themselves, there was often better 
cooperation and cohabitation within the community. 
 
Ex-combatants are also mistrusted, and often perceived to be criminals. “When things are stolen, they 
always say it were demobilized who did it.”83 And while indeed there are ex-combatants involved in 
crime, it is often the whole group that is pointed at. This is partially caused by their lacking economic 
reintegration.  
 
In Burundi it is normal for people to think bad things of people who do not work or go to school. 
Ex-combatants often do not have any work and when there are problems they are indeed often 
suspect. When they returned they fell into a situation where they have nothing to do. So when 
there is crime, people think it was them because they have nothing on their hands.84  
 
Vice versa, where relationships were good between community members and ex-combatants, it was 
because, “they work here but elsewhere they have been stigmatized because they have no work.”85 
Notable in this regard is that when economic reintegration is lacking, this has a great influence on 
social reintegration, i.e. acceptance of ex-combatants in their communities. Whereas economic 
motivations often were not the main reason for demobilizing,  a lack of economic support does affect 
the reintegration process. 
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5.2.2. Behavior and Psychological Problems 
Further, in the reintegration package little accommodations were made for behavioral and 
psychological problems. Apart from economic problems, stigmas are also aggravated by the behavior 
of some ex-combatants. Some, especially those who were in rebel groups, feel excluded by 
communities or are afraid to return empty handed. They are then reintegrating in communities where 
they had not previously lived, which further complicates reintegration. Again others express a feeling 
of superiority. Members of the ex-FAB sometimes feel they have been members of a respectable 
institute, or ex-combatants feel they have fought for the rest of the community and deserve some 
credit for this. “Those that came from the woods came with the idea in mind that they had proven 
themselves, that they were something of a hero. In reality, he was dependent and rejected.”86 There is 
also still fear of ex-combatants and they are often believed to still have weapons and to be under the 
influence of their former commanders or politicians. “We are sometimes accused of military behavior. 
People use machetes to work the land but when they see an ex-combatant with one they think it is 
trouble. The relation is not good because we are regarded as some other type of human being.”87 
 
Ex-combatants are also troubled by psychological problems and trauma. Frequently there were 
complaints about sleeping bad and having nightmares. Many have seen a lot of violence, have lost 
their houses, friends and family, and women have often also been raped. “There are still bullets and 
grenade fragments in our bodies and a spirit of war in our heads.”88 Every group has been affected by 
the war and many people have psycho-social problems, but ex-combatants arguably even more.89 
Overall, hardly any psychological support is given and “it is nature that has to solve things.”90 This 
can be problematic, as to some extent traumas need to be addressed before a start can be made with 
reconciliation.  
 
5.2.3. Reconciliation and transitional justice 
When discussing what is needed for social reintegration, an issue that came to the surface was that of 
reconciliation and transitional justice. Communities often experienced a lot of violence, sometimes by 
the hands of the same groups – or even the same individual combatants – who are now living in these 
communities. Community members were forced to help armed groups with transport and supplies, 
villages were pillaged and women were raped. “Different things happened in the war. I myself was 
violated in front of my children. Now we continue to live together without talking.”91 As discussed 
earlier in this report, at the surface social reintegration seems to be relatively successful and in general 
there is peaceful cohabitation. But under the surface problems from the past are lurking. “You may 
say that there is reconciliation because people are living together. But this does not mean that they are 
forgiven. People live together without loving each other, without having forgiven each other.”92  
 
This raises the question of reconciliation and transitional justice, on which the opinions of community 
members, ex-combatants, and representatives of local and international NGOs differ greatly. On the 
one hand there are those who feel the need to discuss the past before there can be true reintegration 
and peaceful development. “We need to unearth the truth, after which people can pardon each other. 
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If everybody knows what happened, there will be peace.”93 On the other hand, there is a lot of fear 
that addressing past violence will create more problems. Not only are people afraid of raising tensions 
by addressing the past, but also do they fear repercussions by those who will be incriminated, either 
directly or after they have served their sentence. For such reasons they pragmatically argue that past 
crimes should just be forgotten. ”They have stolen and killed during the crisis, but if you ask them to 
compensate that, you risk that they want to go back to the bush or go into crime.”94 It was often heard 
that people rather wanted to move on than to talk about the past. And thirdly, there are also people 
that do not see anything that needs to be reconciled: “There is no latent conflict between the 
community and the demobilized. The social reintegration is indeed there and it is economic 
reintegration that is an issue.”95  
 
But even for those who argue that the past needs to be addressed, the question remains when and 
how this should be done. As mentioned above, it can be argued that psychological traumas need to be 
addressed before reconciliation can take place in a constructive manner. Another problem is timing, as 
perhaps more stability is needed to reduce the risk of renewed violence when dealing with the 
sensitive issues of the past. There was also no agreement about the level on which reconciliation and 
transitional justice should be addressed. Many people favoured an approach that focused on the 
community level, as they believed the issues are most urgent there. Others feared that when 
undertaken at a national level, transitional justice mechanisms would be used by the politicians in 
power to take revenge and bury their own crimes. On the other hand, it was argued that not 
addressing the issue at a national level will leave the higher politicians out of the loop, who arguably 
need to be punished if the process wants to bring about any change. Also, some people believed that 
at the local level there is no professional capacity to deal with issues such as rape and killings. 
 
There are plans by the government to work on truth and reconciliation after the elections.96 During a 
speech at the opening of the campaign period for the communal elections, President Pierre 
Nkurunziza explained that, “everybody here has endured hardship, and everybody has lost friends 
and relatives. We have to know why this all happened. […] We can not just blame entire parties. We 
have to look for those individuals who were responsible for crimes.”97 However, combined with the 
current political situation this promise to look at ‘responsible individuals’ indeed seems to hint at 
what many people are afraid of:  
 
Transitional justice is going to be very difficult because people will all lie. Innocent people will be 
jailed and the big fish will walk. For the local level this will have little impact on impunity as 
people will not believe in the process. It will be more a façade the government puts up for the 
international community.98  
 
 
Concluding chapter 5 
Summarizing this chapter, it was found that social reintegration has at first sight gone relatively well. 
Yet, looking deeper into the issue some problems became apparent. To a certain extent people are 
indeed living together in relative peace, but problems such as stigmatization and behavioral and 
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psychological problems remain prevalent. And where efforts have primarily focused on giving ex-
combatants and communities the tools for conflict resolution and preventing stigmatization, hardly 
any attention has been given to psycho-social rehabilitation and reconciliation. Of course, it can be 
questioned to what extent addressing the past and healing relationships is an attainable goal in the 
short-term and therefore whether this should be part of DDR itself. However, reconciliation appeared 
during the research sooner or later as an inevitable part of the process of social reintegration. When 
looking at DDR from a community security perspective and focussing on sustainability in the long-
term, reconciliation has to be taken into account. If reconciliation is not undertaken or cannot be 
undertaken in the immediate post-conflict context, it should be realized that the success of social 
reintegration will remain limited. Keeping this in mind, DDR should not be expected to bring peace 
by itself, but contribute to it. Moreover, linkages have to be made with organizations and projects that 
can address reconciliation issues to fill this gap. 
 
30 
 
6. Community Security: Security Perceptions 
 
“To learn and know the law is one thing but it also has to be applied.”
99
 
 
“The problems are mainly caused by hunger. And the electoral process is also causing insecurity.”
100
 
 
 
In this and the following chapter the focus turns to local security. DDR is expected to have significant 
consequences for local security. At the same time, improved security at the local level is a key 
prerequisite for successful DDR. Yet, many DDR programmes focus on national rather than local 
security and tend to be organized in a very top-down way. Consequently, they not only fail to ensure 
the security of ex-combatants and local population, but also miss opportunities at community level 
that might effectively contribute to peace and security at the local level, thereby increasing chances for 
success of DDR. The following chapters thus focus on community security. The current chapter 
investigates security as it is experienced and perceived at the local level. Chapter 7 then analyses what 
actors and mechanisms exist at the local level to improve community security, the impact they have, 
and the extent to which they complement or substitute for state security provisions. Chapter 8 
explores the topic of civilian disarmament, as this is a key component of community security. This 
then leads, finally, to a discussion of how DDR programmes in Burundi might better link to 
community security. 
 
6.1. Local definitions of security 
With regard to security perceptions, we found that people associate security in the first place with 
peace, and liberty and freedom. In the far majority of cases, irrespective of region, these two were the 
main response given to the question what security means to people. When further exemplifying what 
they mean by peace and liberty, people come up with a range of examples: 
 
• The absence of theft, violence, harassment and intimidation. “Peace is being able to sleep 
peacefully.”101 Particular reference is made here to the security of women, in particular 
freedom from sexual violence or intimidation;  
• freedom of movement, for instance being able to travel in the countryside without fear for 
criminality, but also without restrictions from the authorities (e.g. a state of emergency);  
• political freedom, “security means to live freely, to express yourself freely without any 
fear”;102 
• peaceful cohabitation, good inter-community relations, no discrimination. Sometimes, 
reference is made here to ethnicity or to the relationship between demobilized and other 
community members; 
• security within the family, absence of domestic violence; 
• to be able to work, meeting primary needs such as food, housing and schooling. “Security is 
a state in which you are not lacking anything.”103 
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Broadly speaking, security to Burundians means the absence of war and criminality so that one can 
enjoy one’s freedom optimally. Yet, security is not exclusively related to the absence of war and 
violence, but includes elements of ‘positive peace’, such as progress and development, peaceful 
resolution of conflicts, and improved community relationships. At the same time, security perceptions 
are not restricted to state security provision. They also include a personal dimension of security 
experience. People in the communities often link security closely to individual well-being and the 
capacity to develop and realize one’s ambitions. Such definitions remind of the human security 
paradigm current among international development actors. In other words, security according to the 
Burundian people can be broadly interpreted and encompasses more than a perspective that focuses 
on the security of the state.104  
 
6.2. Understandings of insecurity 
Nevertheless, while security has improved compared to the violent past, insecurity remains common. 
It is mostly related to crime, such as theft, banditry, armed robberies, killings and alcohol and drug-
inflicted harassment. Women also often mentioned gender-based violence as an issue of concern. It 
was observed how the abundant availability of small arms was a major cause of insecurity. Yet, 
insecurity was not exclusively related to direct violence, or seen as a consequence of the civil war only. 
Here, again, the importance of development and individual well-being was emphasized. Poverty, a 
lack of food, healthcare and schooling were seen as major factors of insecurity, and even as a direct 
cause of criminality. As a community member in Bubanza remarked: “Poverty is the beginning of 
insecurity. When people are not satisfied the insecurity starts,”105 and an ex-combatant in Bujumbura 
Mairie: “Security means you have something to eat. Because if you don’t have anything to eat you can 
easily be manipulated.”106 A prominent source of insecurity mentioned in most communities are land 
conflicts. Land conflicts were cited several times as an important – if not the major – motivation for 
killings taking place at community level. Rather than an inter-ethnic phenomenon, or an issue of 
returning refugees finding their land occupied by others, many of those disputes involve brothers or 
other family members. They include disputes about the division of the inheritance, land sales without 
consultation of other family members, or disputed access to land of orphans and widows (see also van 
Leeuwen, 2010). 
 
Another source of insecurity is fighting between political parties. This was seen to have direct 
repercussions at the local level. This was particularly the case in the north-western provinces107 where 
the dominant opposition party is most numerous and the war has lasted longest. People indicated that 
security was precarious and reversible. In particular after the communal elections people reported that 
the political situation was a critical determinant of (in)security levels. Ex-combatants were said to be 
under control of politicians and could easily resort to the use of intimidation and violence to further 
political goals. Such insecurity was seen to be on the increase leading up to and during the electoral 
period. Stories about intimidation to vote for particular political parties abounded. Accusations of 
fraud during the communal elections made by politicians at the national level strongly resonated at 
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the local level. Several times, we heard accounts of ex-combatants being paid to mess up rallies of 
opposing political parties. In connection to this, people also referred to the importance of rumors as a 
source of insecurity. “There is insecurity when there is fear, fear of another war. Rumors bring 
insecurity,” as someone said in Gihanga.108 For instance, rumors abound about rebel-movements-
turned-political-parties maintaining hidden weapon stocks, or community members being provided 
with weapons by political parties. 
 
It is important to notice that not in all communities political developments at national level played a 
role in local level (in)security. Invariably, at local level, security strongly depended on the 
relationships between local government representatives, the police, local leaders, and the population 
including the demobilized. The nature of relations between local population and their authorities 
affected the quality of security provision as well as security perceptions. For instance, in Itaba 
commune (Gitega) there seemed to be good relations and regular interaction on security matters 
between community members and their authorities. In Butezi commune (Ruyigi), the relationship 
with the police was considered good, and in case of insecurity the police was seen to respond 
adequately to demands for intervention from the population. In contrast, in other communities, 
people made remarks on their lack of trust in security forces or local authorities, or on limits on their 
freedom of expression posed by local authorities. Frequently, the police was seen as incapable to 
address problems of insecurity, due to its limited capacity or its own engagement in criminal 
behavior. 
 
6.3. (In)security and ex-combatants 
In many communities, insecurity was associated with the presence of ex-combatants. We heard 
accounts of people being afraid of ex-combatants, for instance because of their past involvement in 
human rights violations, pillage or theft in the very community where they were now reintegrated, or 
due to suspicion that they might have committed such acts. People have also experienced harassment 
by ex-combatants who regard themselves of a higher status than normal citizens, having fought for 
the interests of the country. Further, community members perceive a relationship between ex-
combatants and criminality. Demobilized are often thought to be involved in armed robberies, theft 
and political violence. This did not appear to merely be a prejudice. Some interviewees could give 
very specific examples of the involvement of ex-combatants in criminal behaviour in their 
communities. Further, the presence of ex-combatants is considered to have contributed to the 
availability of weapons, or the occurrence of violence. In this connection, people referred to the 
example of people that want to take revenge and then hire an ex-combatant to do the job. Yet, many 
community members are well aware that the relationship between ex-combatants and violence or 
criminality is based on a stigma. Accounts from different communities evidence that such stigmas are 
difficult to overcome, though may gradually dampen. The extent to which prejudices against ex-
combatants are overcome seems closely related to the attitudes of ex-combatants and receiving 
communities towards each other. The willingness of ex-combatants to reintegrate, and the willingness 
of communities to accept them can be influenced – but not determined – by sensitization preceding 
their return to the community. Such sensitization efforts aim at reducing tensions within communities 
for instance by programmes that foster mutual understanding and promote susceptibility to each 
other’s grievances. The underlying assumption is that sensitization can create more awareness and 
willingness to overcome the past and be the start of an eventual reconciliation process.  
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Assessments of the security situation, of the contribution of authorities and police to (in)security, and 
of the extent to which insecurity and criminality was associated with ex-combatants varied per region. 
In the communities we visited in centre of the country (Gitega, Muramvya), the security situation 
appeared good, though land disputes featured prominently. Relations with demobilized were 
relatively good. People often responded banditry was caused by people from elsewhere. Often, they 
did not know the criminals caught in their communities, and therefore were unaware if they were ex-
combatants of not. In comparison to the other regions, there was more trust in local authorities and 
police. In the communities visited in Bururi, people also reported that security had improved and 
pointed out the region was relatively unaffected during the war. They also argued that due to the 
ethnically mixed families in this part of the country ethnically partisan behavior, also on part of the 
police, was often corrected. In the north-western provinces (Bubanza, Cibitoke), people reported that 
security was more tense, and pointed more often to the demobilized as the source of insecurity. They 
hinted that demobilized were still in close contact with political leaders and that their behavior was 
dependent on instructions by their political leader. There were also stories circulating about the 
distribution of arms to civilians.  
 
 
Concluding chapter 6 
Thus, both ex-combatants and other community members interviewed considered security to be a 
very broad concept, ranging from the absence of theft and violence to security within the family and 
the ability to work and eat. While security has improved in comparison to the violent past, insecurity 
remains common. It is mostly related to crime, such as theft and armed robberies, violence related to 
land conflicts, and violence related to politics. In many communities, rightly or wrongly, it is also 
believed to be associated with ex-combatants. 
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7. Community Security: Security Actors 
 
“We always say security in Burundi takes three actors:  
the police, the administrateur, but also the community itself.”
109
 
 
“The police only helps us; we are responsible for our security.”
110
 
 
 
This chapter deals with security actors in Burundi. We were particularly interested in how local 
communities understand and evaluate security provision, and how DDR has affected community 
security mechanisms. Ex-combatants are often regarded as a potential source of insecurity as after 
their return they may fall back into criminal behaviour for making a living. The extent of successful 
reintegration is thus an important determinant for community security.  Further, part of the rationale 
behind our research was that previous research has shown that in fragile states communities may fall 
outside the scope of state security provision due to its limited reach. In addition, communities may be 
apprehensive of statutory security providers because of their perceived oppressive nature. To 
complement or even substitute for statutory security provision, non-state actors are often involved in 
the provision of law and order. They may be regarded as legitimate because they provide security and 
do so effectively and affordably. This chapter investigates what actors are involved in security 
provision and their respective roles therein; what impact each security actor has on the security 
experience of people at community level; and the relation between DDR and community security.    
 
7.1. The Police and the State Judicial System 
The police and the state judicial system should in theory provide security and order in society. This 
idea not only lives among the donors intervening in Burundi, but also Burundians in communities 
point out that, ideally, the police should provide security to the civilian population. However, we 
have found that in general there is a lack of trust in the police as security provider. And we were told 
in many instances that the police is often not visible due to their relatively low number and therefore 
arrives late at the site of the crime because they are stationed too far away. This has reduced the 
community’s confidence in the police’s ability to protect against insecurity. Nevertheless, there is a 
difference between urban and rural experience in this regard. It appears the police is more visible in 
areas that are densely populated such as the capital Bujumbura and Gitega. For instance, an ex-
combatant from Bujumbura Mairie explained that there was closer contact between the people and the 
police because people have the phone numbers of local police officers.111 The problem is thus that the 
police is not dispatched enough to local communities. Whereas in urban areas there seem to be plenty 
of police, in rural areas there are not enough officers and they also suffer from a lack of resources such 
as vehicles to patrol, as we were told by a representative of an international NGO.112 
 
An additional factor that causes people to question the police’s motivation is that their security 
provision usually comes at a cost. There are examples where the police asks for money prior to 
intervening. This can partially be explained by the very limited salary policemen receive. Police 
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officers make around 30,000 fbu per month, which is less than US $30. One factor that may explain the 
corrupt behavior is the fact that the police consists of former military forces and groups. They have 
often joined at a young age and resided in the bush for a long time, are often uneducated and illiterate, 
and lack training. They have no knowledge about responsible conduct. Typically, former soldiers and 
rebels were integrated into the police force after having received only very basic training. Because of 
this they have not learnt to enforce laws in an impartial fashion. Like many community members 
mentioned, and which was indicated by a representative from the World Bank as well, it will take up 
much time and resources to teach ex-combatants to administer justice impartially without trampling 
the security of the people.113 Too often, security provision by the state is contrary to the security 
interests of the people. An ex-combatant complained for instance that the police “should be protecting 
civilians. But for the police in Burundi it is the contrary: they protect political leaders. A while ago the 
police was ordered by the state governor to arrest an opposition leader. Now he is dead.”114 There are 
many more examples where state security forces bring insecurity, rather than security. 
 
Corrupt behaviour by the police and justice system is seen to be the rule rather than the exception. 
Corruption amongst police is pervasive as criminals are often being released by bribing police officers. 
However, corruption is certainly not limited to low ranking policemen, and people indicated that it is 
also police officers with higher salaries and those involved in the judicial system that engage in 
corruption. “The police come when we call them and there are no problems. It’s more the justice 
system, the police commissioners who cause problems. And also the Officer of the Judicial Police.”115 
Sometimes ethnic affinity is a factor in corrupt behaviour. A representative from a local NGO 
explained that Hutu police sometimes cover the wrongs of Hutu friends and the same applies to the 
Tutsi.116 Moreover, ex-combatants who return to their community sometimes know the policemen 
from the armed groups they were part of, and work together in criminal activities or are easily 
released when they are arrested. When asked what can be done to combat corruption, community 
members point to donors to control where their money ends up. Often aid is blocked from above and 
does not trickle down. If donors would offer more transparency as to what money is spent on what 
projects, communities would be better able to provide valuable feedback whether they actually enjoy 
the benefits of the donor money, and thereby help to address corruption.  
 
Here, it should be taken into account that for many people in Burundi the notion of corruption does 
not always have so many negative associations as it has for outsiders. What is considered by outsiders 
to be negatively affecting governance and economic development might in some instances reflect 
traditional practices. This is aptly illustrated by the Kirundi word used for corruption, “igiturere”, 
which also refers to the gifts traditionally given to a customary chef. To Burundians such practices are 
regarded as positive. If payment for services the government should provide is understood from such 
a conception, it may be felt not as something illegal, but rather as in line with the idea that local 
leaders needs to be pleased in order to have something your way. A representative from a local NGO 
told us that the Kinyarwandan term “iruswa” covers the negative western connotation to the word 
corruption and should perhaps be used instead.117 Either way, although in local practice there are is 
normally a clear line between what is acceptable and what is not, it becomes clear that corruption is 
not necessarily regarded as something negative. This has implications for donor efforts to combat 
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corruption. The question is how to convince Burundians of the negative impact of corruption on the 
quality of governance and economic development.   
 
Even though corruption in the police and tribunals is common, the police is not regarded as 
necessarily worse than before the war started. Before the onset of the civil war in 1993 the police was 
dominated by the Tutsi minority so the Hutu majority feared this ethnicized security provider. To 
some therefore, the situation has improved now the police contains both Hutu and Tutsi members. 
“Before 2005, if you saw the police in front of your house and you are Hutu, you ran away. And if you 
heard shots being fired you were afraid the police would come. But now when the police comes by I 
even ask them for a ride. Who would have thought I would ever ask the police for a ride?”118 The 
inclusion of all ethnicities in the police seems to have led to better security levels because it reduces 
ethnic tensions. For instance, in Bururi, where the police consists of both Hutu and Tutsi, it was 
mentioned that if community members or policemen of one ethnicity cause trouble, they are corrected 
by their co-ethnics.119 
 
There do seem to be regional differences in the relationship between local communities and state 
security actors. In Bururi people seem to rely more on the police to provide for security. When there 
are problems with insecurity people call the police who come and start an investigation. In other 
regions there is hardly any direct contact between the police and the population, and contact usually 
runs through the chef de colline, chef de zone or administrateur. This may be caused by a lack of trust in 
the police, but also the lack of police present in the communities. From a historical point of view the 
community has not regarded the police as the default security provider, as the police was introduced 
during colonialism as a system of the oppressor and after independence the institution was often used 
in similar fashions by the new national leaders. This points to the importance of the role of local 
leadership in security provision but also in mediating the relationship with statutory security 
providers. In other regions, such as Bubanza, the relationship between the population and the police 
appears to be much worse. In more instances people take care of their own security because they do 
not have faith in the justice system as criminals are easily released and impunity continues to reign. 
For regions where there is more success in security provision, this was often the result of favorable 
relationships between the different security providers at the local level; not only local administration 
and police, but also community members, and Bashingantahe. 
 
People thus tend to have a low esteem of the contribution of the police to security at the local level. 
The police are often perceived as incapable or even unwilling to provide the security communities 
need, and this explains why the relationship between the police and community members is poor. 
Even more worrying is the fact that the police as statutory security provider is often seen to contribute 
to insecurity. There are plenty of examples of police officers that behave aggressively towards 
civilians. People complain that instead of protecting the people they aim their weapons at the 
population. There is evidence that policemen liaise with criminals by offering them their uniforms and 
weapons in return for some money (CENAP, 2008: 86). Government officials attempt to downplay this 
fact. For instance, according to the spokesmen of the president, the police is not causing problems but 
criminals who buy police uniforms. This does, however, suggest the involvement of police officers 
because, as was asked by a representative from a local NGO:  “How can you obtain police uniforms in 
the first place?”120 
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Apart from systematic shortcomings such as the absence of a reliable law enforcers and limited 
awareness about applicable law and punishment, the unchecked behavior of local administrators in 
the security sector is not without problems either. Consider this story:  
 
In the colline over there a women killed her baby and threw him in the toilet. The women was 
caught and she admitted she had done it. And when we destroyed the toilet we indeed found a dead 
baby. She was put in jail but released after 15 days. I would catch her again when I see her. I went 
to the procureur and told him that is not acceptable that someone is released after such a horrific 
crime. But they told us there is no alternative and told us people who complain should be in jail. 
Then we found out that there was a relation between this women and the procureur. They are like 
gods. It is difficult to change things!121 
 
Without impartial application of the law, respect for it will not easily emerge. Another example is the 
following: 
 
According to the law people are not allowed to stay more than 3 days in the communal prison. 
They only stay there to do inquiries and make up the dossier. Then they have to go to the central 
prison of the province. But if it is only a small crime they don’t want to bother and just release 
them again. So if you want him to sit out his punishment in the communal prison longer than 
three days then you have to pay his meals.122   
 
Currently, people don’t know which punishment is normally given for which crime. If they would be 
better aware of this, cooperation between community, police and the justice system might improve as 
well as the security situation. On the other hand, the application of the law is sometimes criticized by 
people. People in Gitega said they regarded the police as a nuisance because they would stop people 
who brew beer illegally.123 People thus sometimes regard the police as a hindrance for developing 
their livelihood. 
 
As a result, a picture emerges that the police is far from uniformly seen as determined to protect 
civilians. Rather, at times they seem to be serving their personal interests. Moreover, they appear to be 
under the tutelage of political elites.  Part of the explanation is that the police consists for a large part 
of members from former rebel groups, whereas the army consists of former rebels as well as a large 
proportion of professional soldiers of the former FAB. According to an Embassy official, this makes 
reforming the police arguably a much more daunting task than reforming the army.124 Moreover, 
while the army is separated from individual governors, governors have a lot of influence over the 
police which further induces corruption. 
 
Military 
The official task of the new military forces of Burundi is to deal with threats to national security. 
Therefore, the military is not – and not often mentioned as such – a daily security provider. 
Nevertheless the military is by some considered to be more disciplined and more reliable than the 
police. People report that the security in the community has improved now that the army has been 
stationed there to ensure safety during the electoral season. Others disagree and say there is no 
difference between army and police except for their uniform, while the police are simply more visible 
in communities and hence able to create more problems. However, it may be assumed that the army is 
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better organized than the police force, which consists of former military personnel who have not yet 
received the training necessary to impartially enforce the law in cases of conflict in the community. 
Interesting in this regard would be to find out whether and how the political leaders distinguished 
between those eligible for the police and those eligible for the army, the latter being more desired by 
most ex-combatants. If the better organized elements of the ex-FAB and the CNDD-FDD were indeed 
favored for positions in the army due to their relations with the political leadership, this could explain 
why the army is sometimes perceived to be better able to provide security compared to the police in 
which more loosely organized and less trained rebels were integrated. The political influences on the 
vetting process thus clearly have important consequences for Security Sector Reform (SSR)125. The 
police would require more support if it is to become a capable security provider. 
 
7.2. Local State Structures 
State security provision at local, community level is formally organized by the leadership at various 
administrative levels. The administrateur, chef de zone, chef de colline, and the Nyumba Kumi are the 
respective security actors at the lowest administrative categories. Burundi is divided in 17 provinces, 
which are subdivided into communes, headed by an administrateur. Each commune is divided in zones, 
headed by chef de zones or conseilleurs. The zones are divided into collines, which consist of roughly 
three to five hilltops, headed by a chef de colline. Those again are divided in sub-collines or cellules, and 
Nyumba Kumi (literally ‘ten houses’; in practice this may be up to twenty). The respective 
administrative structures are taking care of problems with insecurity in upward degrees of severity.   
 
The Nyumba Kumi is elected by the people of the concerning households. Everybody over 18 can vote. 
Women can also become Nyumba Kumi, just as they can take up office as chef de zone, colline and take 
part in the local security committee.126 The origins of the Nyumba Kumi security structure did not 
become entirely clear. Some community members indicated it had existed since the monarchy, i.e. 
since the fifteenth century. Another local state security structure is that of the local security 
committees that have been set up. They consist of five members, and may include ex-combatants. 
They are elected by members of the community and have contact with the police through the chef de 
colline. However, membership of the comité de sécurité is voluntary and it was explained that it 
therefore does not always function optimally. 
 
In practice, people are unaware of the exact workings of the state security structure. They do not know 
which administrative level to contact when something is wrong. Because of people’s unawareness of 
whom to contact, people therefore often just contact their chef, preferably at the highest reachable 
level. As a result issues are not often brought to lower levels of administration, such as Nyumba Kumi. 
Instead, as a member from Gitega commune told us, they are taken straight to the chef de zone or 
administrateur, who have become overburdened as a result127. Also, instead of directly contacting the 
police, this is often done through the chef de colline or chef de zone. In addition, the chefs themselves 
sometimes insist that cases are taken to them. There is therefore little contact between police and the 
community, although this differs per region. Not only does this represent an obstacle to a positive 
working relationship between the police and communities, it also overburdens higher levels of the 
local administration.  
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More positive results for security were often reached in communities where the police, administration 
and community work closely together. Indeed, when we asked in communities with little security 
problems what the difference was between their situation and that in communities with more 
problems, they often indicated that there was a close cooperation between the community, the 
community administrators and the police. This cooperation falls under the notion of Nyabutatu and 
these local initiatives are usually initiated and managed by the chef de colline. For instance, in Itaba 
commune reunions are organized between representatives of these three actors. Security issues are 
addressed and this fosters a close relationship between these groups.128 When local leaders organize 
reunions between the police, the community and local authorities there is also an exchange of 
information between them. This may make communities feel safer. It also makes the police better 
aware of the threats to security in the area which may improve their behavior. In contrast, when such 
reunions are not held, communities feel left alone and this also causes people to think they may get 
away without punishment if they commit a crime. By creating a closer relationship problems are being 
prevented. The quality of the relationship between the local leaders and the police is an important 
determinant in explaining the level of security. Where this relationship is good, people report to feel 
safe and secure. Behavior is more closely monitored and in some communities where relations are 
good prisoners are not released after paying a bribe. Because of these reasons, people sometimes 
express a desire for arranging security at the lowest level:  
 
We should organize our security from the bottom-up and not from the top-down. We need to start 
as locally as possible and only go to a higher level when it is needed. I think sensitization should be 
a priority when it comes to realizing this.129  
 
7.3. Bashingantahe 
The institution of the Bashingantahe is typical for Burundi. The Bashingantahe are a traditional 
authority structure that has functioned parallel to, and independent from, state authorities.130 Their 
role was to intervene in case of problems between community members and to defend the interest of 
the people against government representatives. They operate on the basis of customary regulations 
and conventions. Their traditional roles included keeping the land record, overseeing land 
transactions, settling local disputes, reconciling individual persons and families, and representing the 
local population to the authorities (see Laely, 1997; Ntabona, 2002; Ntsimbiyabandi and 
Ntakarutimana, 2004). They generally serve as bridge builders and reconcile conflicting parties when 
the need arises. In the past, this institution consisted of the most respected community members on a 
colline (‘hill’/‘community’), and functioned independently of the local chiefs.  
 
The institution’s role has eroded over time. After decolonization they lost the authority to dispense 
justice, while in the 1960s and 1970s the appointment of Bashingantahe became tied up with political 
affiliation (Nindorera, 1998; Reyntjens and Vandeginste, 2001; Deslaurier, 2003: 88). Halfway the 1980s 
the Bashingantahe were officially re-established as an auxiliary judicial institution, implying that 
dispute cases could only be transferred to the local Tribunal if the Bashingantahe were incapable of 
solving them (Holland, 2001). Violence since 1993 further weakened the institution. Considered 
community leaders, several Bashingantahe were the direct targets of violence (Ntsimbiyabandi and 
Ntakarutimana, 2004: 54). At the same time, the international community and Burundians themselves 
still hold the Bashingantahe in high regard, and as a possible alternative for the slow, expensive and 
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corrupt state juridical system. Accordingly, it is argued that the institute should be revitalized (e.g. 
Ntahombaye et al., 1999; ICG, 2003; Huggins, 2004). Their importance was recognized in the Arusha 
Agreement which called for the need to solidify the Bashingantahe, and emphasized their role in local 
reconciliation. 
 
Debates about the role that the Bashingantahe should or should not continue to play in the 
communities often concerned the following issues. In the first place, in public discussions, the 
Bashingantahe were criticized for having lost legitimacy and integrity. It was pointed out that certain 
Bashingantahe had justified army repression, or had failed to condemn exclusion during the war 
(Ntsimbiyabandi and Ntakarutimana, 2004: 57–58). Certain political parties have portrayed the 
Bashingantahe as an elitist and Tutsi institution, or as being related to particular political parties 
(Deslaurier, 2003), a perception that was also shared by some Burundian NGOs. A common critique 
was that they too had become corrupt, asking for payments, contrary to the tradition (Dexter and 
Ntahombaye, 2005).  
 
Others were worried about the kind of justice the institution represented. The institution exists 
parallel to the official judicial system. In contrast to the local tribunals that base themselves on state 
legislation, the Bashingantahe rely in the first place on custom. In particular in cases about land and 
inheritance, customary law is unfavourable towards women. In addition, the juridical status of their 
verdicts remains disputed, not only at the local but also at the political level. In 2005 legislation on the 
division of responsibilities between different juridical institutions, the institution of the Bashingantahe 
appears to have lost almost all its responsibilities: it is only attributed a role in assisting the Tribunaux 
de Résidence to execute judgments about non-registered land properties.131 This unclarity about their 
juridical status creates a lot of confusion. Furthermore, some criticized the limited accessibility of the 
institution to women, youth, Batwa (a marginalized ethnic group), and the poorer segments of the 
population. Intervening organizations thus considered that revitalization was a matter of not only re-
establishing structures but also reforming the institution of Bashingantahe. 
 
An important issue in discussions about the role the institution should or might play is the decrease of 
authority of the institution in many communities. In the past, to be nominated as Mushingantahe132, a 
person needed to be over 25 years of age, and to prove his merit by his general behavior and attitude, 
his deeds and public statements. The installation as Mushingantahe was preceded by a period of 
preparation, training and initiation to the function. While candidates needed not be very wealthy, to 
prevent corruptibility, poor or indebted persons were excluded (Nindorera, 1998). With the 
rehabilitation of the institution, those procedures have been more or less formalized, but also 
transformed. According to a representative from a Burundian research institute, young people can 
become Bashingantahe now and that has caused people to have less confidence in them because they 
lack experience.133 There is now quite some variation in how the Bashingantahe are being invested. A 
community member in a colline of Gitega commune complained that for them, “the system of 
investment is now the opposite of what it used to be. It is no longer something from the people.”134 It 
was argued by some communities that only rich people stand a chance to become Bashingantahe and 
that the community members have less say in who gets invested. This dilutes the institute even more. 
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The election of communal representatives and CCDC has further affected their position. In some 
regions, this has resulted in fierce competition between the Bashingantahe and the elus locaux. Some 
Bashingantahe are disappointed they no longer have the prestigious position they had in the past. 
That is why they are often conflict with the elus locaux, and is cooperation with the chef de colline not 
always positive. Officially they have to work together, but the unclarity about their respective 
jurisdiction and authority causes confusion and contestation. Cooperation to resolve this unclarity 
about who possesses authority on what issues has not come about, possibly due to mutual fear of 
losing authority to the other. Another factor contributing to the dispute about the legitimacy of the 
Bashingantahe may be that Bashingantahe are associated with the past Tutsi leadership, and therefore 
a nuisance to the new political elite. A local researcher pointed out to us that there is an ethnic factor 
now too, with many Bashingantahe of Tutsi origin and many chefs de colline and local community 
councils from Hutu origin.135 In other communities, however, a modus operandi of working together 
has been established. The question therefore remains in how far they are able to take their place 
alongside state authorities until they have literate skills as well as an understanding of modern laws 
and governance.  
 
In the past, the institute of the Bashingantahe thus played an important role in resolving local conflict 
as an alternative to the state judicial system. Their jurisdiction has eroded over time due to changes in 
the law and as a result, they have lost legitimacy in the eyes of the population. However, the current 
judicial system operates far from perfect and contributes to insecurity. At the same time, many people 
consider that the Bashingantahe, when functioning properly, may still form a valuable alternative to 
the failing judicial system. They remain to represent traditional values, so called “ubushingantahe”, 
which are widely respected in Burundi and to which people try to adhere even though circumstances 
remain dire. One local journalist told us that the values the Bashingantahe represent are still in the 
hearts of the people.136 We even came across people explaining there are some communities who 
organized a group of Bashingantahe following the traditional rules to work parallel to (and in protest 
to) the Bashingantahe system that is institutionalized by the CNDD-FDD government. This was 
confirmed by a renowned local researcher.137 Communities therefore do not only undergo security 
and insecurity, but they also take action themselves. 
 
7.4. Local Security Arrangements 
Generally, the response to a malfunctioning police varies from taking matters into one’s own hands or 
by asking the local leaders to talk to police commanders to solve problems. Another important factor 
is the fact that for historical reasons the institution of the police has been met with reservations. Due to 
its repressive nature in the colonial era and thereafter, people have developed a certain intrinsic 
reservation to go to the police. There is not always automatic reliance on the police as security 
provider. People do not always regard the police as security institute of first instance and may be 
more inclined to approach someone they trust more to help resolve problems with security, such as 
the village chief. Although the belief that the police should be responsible for security has indeed 
become more prevalent over the years, its current poor functioning reinforces the reliance on non-
statutory security providers. Given the lacking capacity, problems with corruption in the justice 
system, and a resulting lack of trust in statutory security provision, local security initiatives have seen 
their role expand. In one community we were even told that the police willingly delegates security 
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provision to the community. According to the police in this community, community members were 
responsible for the insecurity in the past by sending their men and youngsters to war, and therefore 
should now be responsible for providing security as well.138  
 
At local level, security experiences are influenced by the quality of relationships between local leaders, 
the police, and community members, including ex-combatants, themselves. Although the levels of 
these problems vary significantly, they are considered to be of national concern. Some communities 
have a closer relationship with the police, giving them leverage to press for friendly behavior. Others 
have a chief of police with good intentions who punishes wrongdoing police. Corruption, however, is 
almost everywhere a problem, especially at the level of investigating officers and other higher ranking 
officers. 
 
When confronted with a security problem people may take action themselves as well. People organize 
themselves, generally ad hoc, to patrol an area where theft has become common and chase – and 
sometimes catch – the perpetrator in case of a new attempt. With smaller issues, such as theft, people 
often administer justice themselves, if the perpetrator admits the theft and repays the stolen goods. In 
larger cases the perpetrator is handed over to the police, generally through cooperation with the chef 
or administrateur. When there is little trust in the state security sector perpetrators are also punished 
by communities themselves. In Nyabihanga, local people organized night patrols because of the 
robberies at night. This helped and security has become better.139 Similarly, in Gitega we learnt about a 
structure whereby they would organize night patrols in groups of ten people: when the first group of 
ten men is tired, the second group of ten men takes over. We were told in one community that, “with 
this system the whole community is unified and works together like we are one. Security is not 
something individual, but it means working together.”140  
 
Yet these local security systems suffer from shortcomings as well. Communities take matters into their 
own hands, often without investigation of who committed what crime. This can result in cases of mob 
justice where individuals are simply beaten or killed for a theft, especially when it concerns a suspect 
from outside the community. This is not necessarily so and punishment may also be in line with 
traditional norms and values regarding crime. Sometimes communities feel their actions are 
vindicated because they believe, sometimes rightly so, that the police will release the criminal shortly 
after he is taken into custody.  
 
Less violent are the efforts to resolve conflicts in the communities by local NGOs and church affiliated 
local committees. We found that with smaller matters communities often ask local NGOs for advice 
regarding security matters as well.  As a result, local NGOs have become involved in peaceful conflict 
resolution, promotion of interethnic cohabitation and teaching vocational skills. Apparently there is 
demand for these services but they are not provided for by statutory actors. So NGOs actually play a 
role in dealing with security problems as well.141 Yet, such efforts to mediate conflicts remain non-
statutory and therefore lack a sound legal basis. 
 
 
Concluding chapter 7 
There are many problems with regard to security provision at the local level. The police taking care of 
security is inexperienced, ill-trained, underequipped and does not have the capacity to provide the 
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security the local population desires. Corruption exacerbates this problem, and the trust of the civilian 
population in the police is in general limited. In regions where there is more security and trust in the 
police, this can be attributed to the relationship the communities, the local administration and the 
police have. Also the institution of the Bashingantahe, even though its role has been disputed and their 
standing has diminished over the years, remains to be an important actor for security provision at the 
local level. The lack of state security provision further stimulates the role of non-state actors in security 
provision, both ad-hoc organized neighborhood patrols and locally organized committees that 
regularly meet to deal with security issues in the community.  
44 
 
8.  Community Security: Civilian Disarmament   
 
“But in the end disarmament has to come from within.  
If this is not the case people will just buy new weapons.”
142
 
 
“There is disarmament but at the same time there is armament of others. 
Disarmament to arm others.”
143
 
 
 
On the basis of what we heard in the communities it seems that there are still a lot of civilians who 
posses a firearm or other small arms. This is the case despite weapon collection programs among 
civilians. In fact, there is a lot of discussion about how effective such programmes have been. 
Government officials have made statements that about 80% of small weapons have been collected, 
based on a report of the Small Arms Survey that estimated that there were about 100,000 SALW in 
civilian hands in Burundi.144 Yet, various civil society organizations refute these claims. They point 
out, for instance, that it is very unclear how the government has arrived at its figure of 80,000 collected 
weapons. Some claim the number included discovered cashes, unregistered weapons of the police, 
collected worn out arms of the police and army, and military uniforms and equipment. One source 
stated that most weapons were collected in the capital itself rather than in the interior.145 Others point 
out that the number of 100,000 SALW was unrealistic in the first place, and that a more realistic 
estimate is 200-300,000 arms in civilian hands.146  
 
Community members in all provinces confirm the continued presence of arms in their communities. 
Examples abound of gunshots and grenade explosions been heard, and armed robberies that have 
taken place. Stories are told about hidden arm stocks that are discovered. Yet, people find it very 
difficult to assess current possession of arms in their communities. As one woman explained: “even 
my husband would not tell me if he had a weapon”.147 Ex-combatants are particularly suspected of 
still possessing weapons. On the other hand, in case people are aware of weapon possession, it is said 
they are afraid of denouncing, out of fear for repercussions.   
 
The belief that civilian disarmament is necessary is widely shared. All people interviewed thought 
disarmament of the civilian population necessary. Examples abound of how insecurity is caused by 
the continued presence of arms among the population: criminals use small arms to rob others, people 
resort to the use of arms to settle scores, grenades are thrown at houses to underline threats or in 
revenge. Instances are also given of lethal accidents with firearms. In some communities, interviewees 
claimed that security had greatly improved after the first civilian disarmament programme, 
emphasizing the need for further programmes for civilian disarmament. 
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Yet, community members, observers from (inter)national NGOs, and funding agencies alike 
underscore that disarmament is highly problematic in case there is still insecurity in the communities. 
As long as security providers from the government are incapable to assure security at the local level, it 
is unlikely that people are willing to hand in weapons. In fact, a vicious circle has come about: 
insecurity causes people to keep their arms while arms cause insecurity in the first place. It is clear 
that more security is needed before civilian disarmament can take place. 
 
Civil disarmament programmes so far have had some positive impact, but this is generally considered 
insufficient. The government’s CDCPA has organized a civilian disarmament campaign in 
cooperation with the UNDP in a two-month period in which amnesty was given to civilians 
possessing SALW. Trainings were given through which people were taught how to undertake 
sensitization, and the programme provided incentives for weapons to be handed in, such as pieces of 
cloth and bags of cement. There are many complaints about such programs, mainly related to the non-
delivery of promised goods in exchange for the weapons. Sources have indicated that this is likely to 
be caused by bad communication, as a result of which many people were not present at the moment 
goods were distributed. Currently, possessing a weapon is illegal, which poses a hurdle for those 
willing to hand in their weapons. Reporting a weapon for handing it in might well lead to 
imprisonment. The national collection programme lasted for too short a period. The period announced 
for civil disarmament was fixed at two months only. According to a representative of an international 
NGO involved in disarmament activities the UNDP was only informed one month after the decree 
was signed.148 Before government and donors had a proper collection system in place and 
communicated how it worked, the two months were almost over. This has discredited those 
responsible for sensitization preceding disarmament and hinders future disarmament attempts as 
people will have less faith in the promises made in exchange for disarmament.  
 
All parties agree that more security is needed before civilian disarmament can become effective. 
People say they keep their arms for security provision: to protect their belongings against armed 
criminals or out of uncertainty about the political situation. They have limited confidence in the state 
security systems. According to the stories we heard, police officers fail to take action when weapon 
possession is denounced. In fact, we have heard in Rugombo, Cibitoke, that when the community 
complained about a criminal he was released soon after the complaint was filed and took revenge.149 
In some communities, security actors are accused of even committing crimes themselves. The question 
rises whether it is realistic to have high hopes of civilian disarmament at this moment. In particular 
the electoral period posed a lot of insecurity and fear. Rumors abounded that weapons were 
distributed by both the government and political parties of the opposition. This contributed to 
perceptions of insecurity and frustrates efforts to disarm the civilian populations, by raising tensions 
and underscoring the perceived need for people to remain armed. From interviews in the 
communities we may deduct that people still count on the possibility that the situation may get out of 
hands again. In the words of a former World Bank staff member: “Arms are perceived as a means to 
survive and to protect oneself. In such a context civilian disarmament makes little chance”.150 In 
connection to this, various observers speculated that an important obstacle for civil disarmament is 
the lack of political will. For instance, “to the party in power, forceful disarmament is not a good idea 
if they want to win the elections.”151 Some observers suspect that the former armed groups that are 
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now political parties prefer that their supporters among the population keep their weapons, just in 
case politics turn violent again.152 
 
Many people consider compensation necessary for further disarmament. To some extent this may be 
the result of the precedent set by earlier programmes. In the communities, most people we spoke to 
considered compensation necessary. The compensations given so far are considered a trifle in 
comparison to the original costs of buying a weapon. In communities in Muramvya and Gitega we 
heard that compensation was promised but not given, thereby reducing chances for similar efforts in 
the future. Also those involved in civilian disarmament complained that they were not compensated 
for their sensitization efforts and necessary transport. 
 
Some interviewees in the communities suggested that some people see a weapon as a way to sustain 
themselves, for instance through robbing and roadblocks. Handing in a weapon then becomes a 
rational, economic decision. As one ex-combatant crudely observed: “If you go out to steal, you make 
much more in a single night than the things they give you [in return for your weapon]”.153 Hence, in 
addition to a reduction of violence, community members underscore that human security also needs 
to be improved. “It’s the poverty that is the real issue and because of it people are easily recruited to 
fight, because they think they can be better off”.154  
 
Overall, interviewees expected that complete civilian disarmament is unlikely to be achieved. 
Nevertheless, people displayed a strong desire to have less arms among the population, and so 
increase local security. They considered it necessary to break the vicious cycle linking the possession 
of arms with insecurity. Finally, they assessed that past civilian disarmament efforts have positively 
contributed to security. Efforts to limit the number of SALW should therefore continue. In this, it 
seems necessary to link efforts at various levels: 
• fostering political will at national level;  
• sensitization at local level by means of local actors and voluntarily handing in of weapons; 
• linking with local security providers / security sector reform. If people have more 
confidence in the security sector this may make them less reluctant to disarm. 
At the same time, to make such efforts successful requires to establish why in specific situations 
people keep their arms. 
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9. The Impact of DDR on Community Security   
 
From the moment they have started receiving money they participate to get security. They do not steal and 
murder any longer. But they behave like savages when they don’t get their money.
155
  
 
“The reintegration support has been a disguise to collect weapons. During the negotiations people were 
promised a lot, but as soon as the weapons were collected the benefits were gone.”
156
  
 
 
The goal of DDR is to improve security in the post-conflict context and to lay a basis for stability and 
development. This raises the question to what extent and in what way DDR in Burundi has impacted 
on security. With regard to disarmament, it is clear that many weapons still remain in circulation. 
Many ex-combatants are believed to have handed in one weapon while keeping another one hidden. 
Whether this is true or not, it is a public secret that the armed groups still have hidden stockpiles, that 
political parties (formerly armed groups) have distributed weapons to certain members and youth 
groups, and that many weapons remain in the hands of the civilian population. 
 
Demobilization has also not been entirely successful, and according to a representative of an 
international development organization involved in DDR, “command structures were kept in place, or 
at least not completely broken down, and ex-combatants still take orders from their former 
commanders.”157 Ex-combatants themselves also said to be under the influence of politicians, who use 
their social and economic vulnerability to their benefit. “When the politicians are misbehaving the 
demobilized are misbehaving as well.”158 The research was undertaken at the start of the electoral 
period, a time where this problem may have come to the surface as more significant. Nevertheless, it 
remains an important issue that hampers the security situation.  
 
As described in chapter 5, in many cases reintegration has been problematic. For many ex-combatants 
economic reintegration proves to be difficult in a post-conflict context with the few skills they were 
taught. And under the surface also social reintegration seems to be less successful than first 
impressions make believe. The fact that ex-combatants remain susceptible to manipulation by 
politicians has for a large part to do with their problematic reintegration. But their failing reintegration 
also poses other problems, as some ex-combatants remain violent in their home situations and are 
involved in rape and crime. Communities often link crime to the presence of ex-combatants: “before 
the demobilized came there were no cases of violence in which arms were involved.”159 This is 
perhaps a stigma for ex-combatants in general, but a fact with regard to some. And a survey 
undertaken by Oxfam Novib showed that 80% of the people interviewed perceived ex-combatants to 
be a threat to security.160 However, although ex-combatants were often seen as the ones responsible 
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for crimes in the community, community members also acknowledged that these crimes were perhaps 
not exclusively committed by ex-combatants. That ex-combatants are perceived as a security threat is 
partially based on very real problems some of them pose, but it is also very much related to their 
stigmatization, as discussed in chapter 5. 
 
Although the above mentioned problems show that DDR can – and should – still be improved, DDR 
also has a positive impact on security. It was acknowledged that the support did indeed contribute to 
some extent to the reintegration of ex-combatants, by which it improved the security situation. “We 
are happy with the programme because otherwise the ex-combatants would have caused 
problems.”161 And although the support given was perhaps not always enough – or at least not always 
effective – “DDR was necessary.”162 One ex-combatant explained that while the money he received 
was insufficient to start up a business,  
 
The most important impact is that with the money people could make contact with society and go 
into a bar to have a drink with other community members and get acceptance. The bad 
sentiments from the bush could go away because of that. For the rest the money didn’t help, but it 
did help with us being accepted into the civilian society.163 
 
The general consensus is that, “when DDR started it helped improve security, but now, with 
reintegration falling short, it is causing security problems.”164  As ex-combatants first received benefits 
and training in social cohabitation, the problems caused by ex-combatants gradually were reduced to 
some extent. But now that many ex-combatants have problems with economic reintegration, which 
further stigmatizes them and hinders their social reintegration, the problems resurface again. 
 
On the other hand, however, there are examples in which ex-combatants actively participate in the 
security improvement of the community. Ex-combatants have been active in the civilian disarmament 
campaign and there are ex-combatants who take part in the comité de sécurité in the colline. “They 
know the secret of security. Even when they have disarmed, they still know the secret of security.”165 
This works in two ways, however, as not only does this effort of ex-combatants improve the 
relationship with the community, a relationship of trust is also needed for communities to be willing 
to involve ex-combatants in security issues. When the latter is the case, some communities have 
started to see the assets ex-combatants bring into the community, and call on them to participate in 
nightly patrols through the neighborhood. And indeed, we sometimes came across innovative ways to 
increase security involving ex-combatants.  
 
However, although security is perhaps an interesting way in which ex-combatants have found a way 
to contribute to the community and build trust, there are a number of repercussions that should be 
taken into account as well. We found that the ex-combatant must be sufficiently reintegrated to be 
trusted a role in security provision. Some even advocate a clear protocol that outlines what is legal 
and what not.166 This is necessary to ensure night patrols do not end up in violent mob justice. By 
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giving ex-combatants a position in the provision of security one risks reinforcing their combatant 
mindset. Involving ex-combatants that still have a military mindset and/or maintained ties with their 
former commanders clearly forms a risk for community security. These ex-combatants might use their 
new security role again for personal interests or the interests of their commanders and their political 
leaders. 
 
As discussed in chapter 7, it can be questioned whether these civilian patrols in general are a viable 
solution for security problems, as they can end up in mob justice. The point here, however, is that 
some communities have indeed started seeing ex-combatants as assets, rather than as a burden. 
Moreover, it can also be a starting point for community policing; in one interview the example was 
given of Kinama in Bujumbura Mairie, where people organized night patrols and called the police to 
come along.167 
 
 
 
                                                           
167
 Ex-combatant CNDD-FDD, Bujumbura Mairie, 14 June 2010 
50 
 
Conclusions and recommendations 
 
“There is a need to separate security at local level from security at national level.  
At the local level, we need effective collaboration, and a system of monitoring.”
168
 
 
“The good things people in Burundi don’t remember, but unfortunately 
the bad things are never forgotten.”
169
  
 
 
This report is based on ten weeks of field research in Burundi. The research focuses on DDR 
programmes from a community security perspective. Instead of looking at the security of the state the 
research aimed to investigate how DDR impacts on security at the community level. We investigated 
the experiences with DDR not only of ex-combatants, but also of the communities in which they 
reintegrate. In this way DDR is not assessed based on the standards set by those actors implementing 
the programme, but by those actors impacted by it. Therefore, where certain issues raised may 
traditionally not be part of DDR programming or not be considered part of its goals, we raise them 
nonetheless, as they are regarded as pressing issues by the ex-combatants and community members 
affected by the programme. This does not imply that we argue to simply adopt these issues and 
integrate them into DDR as we know it. However, as a voice of our interviewees we cannot neglect the 
importance of the issues they have raised. 
 
A first major issue is that of economic reintegration. One of the ideas behind DDR is to provide 
combatants an economic alternative for fighting. And even while in Burundi the economic benefits of 
DDR were relatively less important than national political reforms to convince ex-combatants to 
demobilize, DDR proved to be unable to address the economic problems ex-combatants faced during 
reintegration. Indeed, DDR is no panacea for economic problems and unemployment in a post-conflict 
context, but more attention to economic reintegration is required. Whether this economic support 
should be part of the DDR programme itself or arranged through programmes linked to DDR is 
another debate, but the economic reintegration of ex-combatants in Burundi has been highly 
inadequate. Ex-combatants complained that the support that was given to them was insufficient. It 
was sometimes not received, or only partially; and even when received in full it proved to be difficult 
for many ex-combatants to start up their lives; houses were destroyed and family members killed. 
Many ex-combatants were also frustrated with the delays in the payment of the instalments. These 
delays caused a lot of ex-combatants to borrow money and run into debts with high interest rates. 
Also the reintegration kit created frustrations and ex-combatants often preferred to have received 
money rather than goods. While vocational training was an option ex-combatants could choose, this 
option was highly unattractive due to the costs participants had to make.  
 
However, in this regard it is also important to note that expectations from the ex-combatants were 
very high. They claimed that the intended DDR support was initially much higher or made 
comparisons to rumors about higher benefits for ex-combatants in other countries. Some ex-
combatants also pointed out, that they had expected a reward from society for their efforts, while 
others experienced that their fellow community members or relatives expected them to return with 
something in their pockets for them. Expectations about reintegration support were therefore often 
                                                           
168
 Representative international NGO, Bujumbura, 17 June 2010 
169
 Representative Local NGO, Gitega, 10 June 2010 
51 
 
very high, and much higher than the actual support given. Raised expectations can be explained by 
unfulfilled promises by the DDR programme, but for a large part also by miscommunications and an 
abundance of rumors. Better expectation management is therefore needed to limit frustrations. Yet, a 
certain level of discrepancy between the expectations of ex-combatants and communities on the one 
hand, and the intentions and possibilities of a programme on the other hand is unavoidable. 
 
Apart from unrealistic, however, complaints were to a certain extent justifiable. While DDR does not 
aim to rebuild houses and create jobs, these are indeed real needs of ex-combatants returning after 
many years in the bush. Moreover, local administrations sometimes excluded ex-combatants from 
wider development programmes as they were thought to have sufficient support through DDR. Given 
the economic problems of ex-combatants, more attention to economic reintegration is thus required. In 
this regard, vocational training and follow-up support are vital for the proper use of the reintegration 
kit. Support can also be given to associations in which ex-combatants and community members work 
together, e.g. in agricultural activities. As DDR is not expected to solve all economic problems, more 
linkages should be made to broader development initiatives, and ways in which communities 
themselves can support the economic reintegration of ex-combatants should be investigated. Here, it 
is also important to realize that certain groups of ex-combatants are clearly worse off than others. 
Reintegration is much more difficult when an ex-combatant has no family or land to return to. 
Especially the concerns of women, handicapped and self-demobilized should be better taken into 
account. The difficulty is how to do this without being seen as advantaging some above others.  
 
Further, community members often pointed to manipulation of the programme for political motives, 
claiming that certain groups have been prioritized. While in many instances such assessments have to 
be related to the ongoing politicization of DDR in Burundi and the perceptions and rumors that are 
present in abundance, in other instances, they are perhaps true to a certain extent.  
 
With regard to social reintegration, it was found that this has at first sight gone relatively well. The 
cohabitation training given during demobilization was positively evaluated, both by ex-combatants 
and communities. Also, past motives for participating in an armed group had lost relevance due to 
political reforms. Political objectives had been realized and to many ex-combatants demobilization 
was a logical step. Also, as many people in the communities to which ex-combatants returned had in 
the past supported the political agendas that ex-combatants fought for, reintegration was a rather 
smooth process. Even if communities had experienced problems with ex-combatants, they often 
claimed that such problems had decreased over time. 
 
Yet, looking deeper into the issue some problems became apparent. While people are often indeed 
living together in relative peace, stigmatization and psycho-social problems remain prevalent. As a 
consequence of poor economic reintegration, many ex-combatants continue to be stigmatized and 
perceived as criminals. Whereas economic motivations often were not the main reason for 
demobilizing, the lacking economic support did affect the reintegration process. Reintegration efforts 
have also largely focused on ex-combatants, leaving the receiving end of the community aside. The 
trainings given during demobilization primarily focused on the resolution of small-scale conflict and 
the prevention of stigmatization and hardly any attention has been given to psycho-social 
rehabilitation and reconciliation. Many ex-combatants have problems readjusting themselves to 
civilian life, for instance being responsible for themselves rather than depending on what was 
provided by their fighting unit. Past violence is not forgotten and people are reluctant to talk openly 
about the real problems in fear of reigniting old conflicts. Addressing past crimes does seldom take 
place. Indeed, it can be questioned to what extent reconciliation is an attainable goal in the short-term 
and therefore whether this should be part of DDR itself. However, reconciliation appeared during the 
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research as an important component of the process of social reintegration. When looking at DDR from 
a community security perspective and focussing on sustainability in the long-term, reconciliation 
issues have to be taken into account. Thus, with regard to DDR, more attention should be given to the 
sensitization of ex-combatants and receiving communities, before and after ex-combatants resettle. 
Moreover, existing forums should be used – and new ones created when unavailable – to provide 
opportunities for the communication of issues and resolution of problems at the community level. 
Local NGO’s would be suitable for this job due to their familiarity with the context of the local 
community. However, in any case it should be realized that reconciliation is often a subject that is 
difficult – if not impossible – to tackle immediately after the fighting has stopped. With this in mind, 
one should be careful what is expected of DDR, especially with regard to the level of reintegration it 
wants to support. 
 
The requirement of connecting DDR to community security in a context-specific manner – the stated 
focus of the working group and elaborated on in its earlier report (Willems et al, 2009) – means 
assessing and adapting to the local security situation. Apart from the experiences with DDR the 
research therefore also focused on security as it was experienced at the community level. Security is 
viewed as a very broad concept, including the absence of direct physical violence but also freedom of 
expression and health. Mentioned as the most pressing issues were theft and robberies, as well as land 
conflicts and the violence related to it. At the time the research was conducted, worries about the use 
of violence during the run up and aftermath the 2010 elections were considered a major cause for 
concern. 
 
The police and judicial system responsible for security provision to the population are regarded very 
negatively. The police exists of former combatants and many are uneducated, illiterate and poorly 
trained to carry out responsible civilian policing. The police is also underequipped and understaffed, 
as a result of which they are often too late and incapable of responding to crime. They are also 
underpaid, which leads to criminal behavior on the side of the police: they rent out their uniforms and 
weapons, commit armed robberies themselves, extort money from people, and are corrupt. The police 
is therefore not only incapable of dealing with the security issues at hand, but often also poses a 
security threat in itself. Corruption is also rampant in the judicial system and because criminals are 
often released quickly after their arrest there is little trust in it.  
 
However, part of the problems is also caused by the fact people are not always familiar with the state 
structure of security provision and who to turn to with certain types of security problems. 
Misunderstandings about the motivations and decisions of state security actors further increase 
perceptions of corruption and unwillingness to provide security. Another issue hampering the 
relationship between the police and communities is its history as an oppressive force, first of the 
colonial powers and later of the ruling Burundian elites. Although this has dramatically improved in 
many parts of the country, due to the police’s incapacities to provide security the first reaction of 
many communities is still to manage security issues themselves. When the police is called to 
intervene, in many cases the police is not contacted directly but indirectly through local chefs. When 
communities take matters into their own hands this is in general a reaction to a rise in thefts and 
robberies. In many cases it includes nightly patrols by communities in order to scare off potential 
thieves. In some cases this also leads to the capturing of suspected criminals and mob justice. 
However, there are also more peaceful initiatives of local NGOs and church affiliated organizations, 
which aim to resolve local security problems through dialogue. In the eyes of some communities, such 
initiatives have become an important security actor. However, it remains problematic that they lack 
legal grounds. Without such coercive force the sustainability of their solution depends on the 
sustained support of all actors involved. In addition, it should be further explored which role could be 
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played by the institution of the Bashingantahe. What has become clear is that the relationship between 
the actors – i.e. the police, local administration and the community (including ex-combatants) – is 
pivotal for security. Whereas SSR efforts aimed at supporting the capacities of the police (i.e. training 
and material support) are important, more attention should be given to the relationship communities 
have with state security providers. In addition, the role of non-state security actors should be taken 
into consideration by SSR practitioners. At times, non-state security actors complement or substitute 
for state security actors to meet security needs of the community. 
 
An important problem causing insecurity is the proliferation of firearms among civilians. Civilian 
disarmament has taken place and while its impact was regarded to be positive, it is also believed to be 
insufficient. The belief that civilian disarmament is necessary is widely shared, although many feel 
that there is insufficient security for disarmament to be successful. People often claim it is necessary to 
have a firearm to protect one’s property and there are rumors that weapons are being distributed by 
both the government and political parties of the opposition. To break this vicious cycle efforts to 
disarm should continue, even if complete civilian disarmament is unlikely in the near future.  
 
Although certainly leading to relative improvements, overall, the impact of disarmament efforts in 
Burundi has been mixed. With regard to demobilization, current political tensions during elections 
have hampered the dissolution of former military ties.  Moreover, demobilization paid too little 
attention to management of combatants’ expectations about civilian life. Furthermore, while 
reintegration is at first sight successful – i.e. people seem to live together in relative peace – failing 
economic reintegration fuels stigmatization and the violence and crimes committed by ex-combatants 
in the past remain an unresolved issue. However, the DDR programme did also contribute to security 
in Burundi. The cohabitation trainings have been well-received and although in many cases still 
problematic, reintegration support has helped the return of many ex-combatants. The level of success 
is also highly dependent on the context, the length of time the fighting has ended compared to other 
regions, to what extent property has been destroyed, and how traumatic the war experience was. 
Important is also the role of local authorities: are they involved in overcoming reintegration problems 
and do they facilitate dialogue? And as not everything can be solved by the DDR programme itself, 
there are local organizations active in certain parts of the country to bring people together through 
sensitization.  
 
 
The implications of the research in context 
What are the implications of the Burundi case study for the literature on DDR? Firstly, the case 
confirms the reality that approaching DDR from a community security perspective opens up new 
possibilities to what is called ‘community-based DDR’ (Willems et al, 2009) or termed ‘Second 
Generation DDR’ by others (Muggah, 2009; UNDPKO, 2010). The issues DDR aims to resolve are large 
scale problems and therefore perhaps difficult to make community-based. An argument could be that 
the large goals and sheer size of the programme are contradicting a community-based approach. 
Nevertheless there are numerous openings for community-based approaches to DDR. For instance, 
our research pointed out that sensitization should be undertaken at a community level. Many local 
organizations with knowledge about the context of the particular communities can fulfil an important 
role in improving the return to, and the reception of ex-combatants to the community and reception 
by the community members. Local forums for problem solving and dialogue should be promoted. 
Also, communities can be much more involved in the economic reintegration of ex-combatants by 
consulting them on what kind of employment possibilities for ex-combatants are available or can be 
created that also will benefit the communities. Currently, reintegration assistance is often not based on 
the needs and skills of the community, thereby limiting its success in terms of livelihood improvement 
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of the people the reintegration assistance aims to help. Moreover, communities can even support 
reintegration by providing learning internships. This would require that support in DDR is not only 
given to the individual ex-combatant but also the communities supporting their reintegration. In the 
end, it is the communities in which ex-combatants reintegrate who facilitate reintegration and thereby 
determine the success of the programme. 
 
Another aspect that came to the surface in Burundi is that economic development is crucial for social 
reintegration. Indeed currently economic reintegration receives much more attention in DDR than 
social reintegration. The latter is often seen as a task of communities and to be a consequence of 
economic support of DDR. More attention to social reintegration is therefore also highly necessary. 
Failing economic reintegration, however, reinforces social stigma and leads to more ex-combatants 
falling back into criminal behavior. While economic support is often given to a certain extent, DDR 
programmes nevertheless often fail to take into account the history many ex-combatants have. Many 
have been recruited at a very young age, have not finished school or have not attended school at all, 
and often resided in the bush for a number of years or even more than a decade. Therefore, short 
projects without proper follow-up support in many cases fail to give the support required for ex-
combatants to successfully sustain themselves in their livelihoods. 
 
 
Recommendations 
 
Based on the findings of this report we have the following recommendations: 
 
For DDR practitioners: 
• With regard to reintegration, take into account the fact that ex-combatants have to start from 
scratch after years of fighting. They not only have to adapt to civilian life, but also to the fact 
that they themselves – rather than their superiors in their unit – are responsible for their own 
life.  More attention to the type of vocational training and follow-up support is required. The 
aim should be to base reintegration on the needs demanded by communities themselves and 
to build on the skills of ex-combatants and community members alike. 
• There is a large discrepancy between ex-combatants’ expectations and experiences. 
Expectation management and improved communication is required. Such communication 
efforts can be supported by local organizations, both state and non-state, at the local level and 
should be undertaken in cooperation with the Burundian government. It should be kept in 
mind, however, that a certain tension between what is expected and what a programme can 
deliver is unavoidable due to uncontrollable rumors of a radio trottoir. 
• Support a system of focal points much longer to keep a way through which ex-combatants can 
express their frustrations and provide feedback about the reintegration process. 
• To promote social reintegration, more attention should be given to the sensitization of ex-
combatants and receiving communities, before and after ex-combatants resettle. Local NGOs 
have the capacity to do so, but need material support. 
• Take into account that reconciliation is an important element for successful social 
reintegration in the long term, even if it is not undertaken through DDR itself. Those 
responsible for planning DDR programmes should be very careful to assume that DDR 
indeed contributes to reconciliation. DDR should lower its expectations in contributing to 
social reintegration and link up with reconciliation projects that can fill this gap. 
• Communities should be more involved in DDR, and the PCDC community development plan 
provides possibilities for this. The projects for the Adultes Associés are a positive step in this 
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direction. It should be noted, however, that these plans are drawn in consultation with 
communities and not directly by them, which is a point for improvement. Moreover, these 
projects conflict with this report’s ideas on projects through which ex-combatants acquire 
knowledge and skills to further their economic independence. 
• Stimulate involvement, and, more importantly, the initiatives of local organizations in support 
of DDR. Local NGOs and church-based organizations have proven to be successful – e.g. by 
providing forums for dialogue between ex-combatants and community members – and their 
involvement should be stimulated. Success stories should be emphasized and can be used as 
examples in other regions of the country. 
 
 
For SSR practitioners: 
 
• There is a clear connection between DDR and SSR and the design of these programmes should 
take into account the timelines, key moments and goals of the other. 
• With regard to SSR it is important to keep in mind the relationship communities currently 
have with the police. While the improvement of police capacities with training and resources 
is important, more attention should be given to the improvement of the relationship between 
the police and local communities. The relationship between the different actors at the local 
level is key for effective security provision. It is therefore necessary to support and promote 
regular dialogue at a grass roots level between the police, local authorities and communities.  
• The police should take a proactive role in the promotion of forums in which communities, 
local administration and police come together to discuss security issues and the police de 
proximité stipulated in the Arusha Agreements should be a model for SSR. 
• Look for other ways through which state security provision can better connect with the needs 
at the local level, and through which the interaction between state security actors and local 
communities can be improved. For instance, by including police in neighborhood patrols, 
which also could prevent mob justice, and by looking for connections with the PCDC 
community development plans. 
• Take into account the valuable role played by non-state security actors that are regarded as 
legitimate and effective security providers. Investigate their role and utility and adjust SSR 
programming on the basis of such findings. 
 
 
For the international community: 
 
• Economic reintegration is vital for social reintegration and should be given more serious 
attention through vocational training efforts and follow-up support. 
• While DDR is not a tool to promote economic development, reintegration efforts should be 
better connected to broader economic development programmes. Economic reintegration is a 
long-term process requiring long-term support to increase the possibilities for economic 
reintegration. 
• Reconciliation proved to be an important element for successful social reintegration and 
should be given more attention. One must be careful to derive inferences from the fact that 
people live together in relative peace. If reconciliation is not undertaken or cannot be 
undertaken in the immediate post-conflict context, it should be realized that the success of 
social reintegration will remain limited. Awareness about the need for reconciliation should 
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be promoted and actual reconciliation efforts should be designed and done in consultation 
with local communities. 
• To improve reintegration of ex-combatants, as well as to improve reintegration of other 
groups (e.g. IDPs, refugees, etc.) and the cohabitation of communities in general, local forums 
for dialogue should be supported in which problems can be discussed and solved. 
• Continue efforts to promote civilian disarmament, but also continue to investigate the reasons 
why people choose to remain armed, thereby hampering disarmament. Benefits for civilian 
disarmament could for instance also be for communities as a whole, and based on the PCDC 
community development plans. 
• Be aware of the valuable role played by non-state security providers and consider 
complementing state-focused DDR and SSR processes with utilizing efficient and legitimate 
non-state security providers.  
• Be more reactive to local differences and be open for local initiatives. Realize that such local 
initiatives could do a lot with relatively little money, if given the opportunity. 
 
 
For the Burundian government: 
 
• Improve awareness and functioning of the state security structure by actively fighting 
corruption and promoting regular dialogue at the grass roots level between the police, the 
local government and the community. The police should take a proactive role in the 
promotion of forums in which communities, local administration and police come together to 
discuss security issues. 
• There is a large discrepancy between ex-combatants’ expectations and experiences. 
Expectation management and improved communication is required. This should be done in 
cooperation with the DDR practitioners from the international community in order to prevent 
conflicting messages. Realistic projections of assistance to ex-combatants and communities 
alike should be the norm and supported by feasible time-frames. 
• Support a system of focal points in the long term to keep a way through which ex-combatants 
can express their frustrations and provide feedback about the reintegration process. 
• To promote social reintegration, more attention should be given to the sensitization of ex-
combatants and receiving communities, before and after ex-combatants resettle. 
• To promote social reintegration, promote forums for problem solving and dialogue at the 
grass roots level. 
 
 
For local initiatives and organizations: 
 
• In order to promote economic reintegration, try to look for ways in which communities and 
ex-combatants can work together to foster economic development, for instance by promoting 
the cooperation of ex-combatants and communities in associations. 
• With regard to vocational training for ex-combatants, try to find ways in which community 
members can pass on their knowledge to ex-combatants, for instance by promoting training 
internships. 
• In order to promote social reintegration, create and/or continue to offer forums for problem 
solving and dialogue at the grass roots level.  
• Undertake sensitization efforts of ex-combatants and receiving communities, before and after 
ex-combatants resettle. 
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• Ex-combatants should be viewed as assets to the community, rather than as a potential 
problem. Try to find locally appropriate ways in which ex-combatants can contribute to the 
community to counter stigmatization of ex-combatants as criminals.  
• Support and promote regular dialogue at a grass roots level between the police, local 
authorities and the community. 
• Look into the potential role of the non-state security providers and clarify their legal position 
vis-à-vis the other prevailing security providers. 
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Annex 1: Ex-combatants and communities interviewed 
 
 
Bujumbura 
Mairie 
 
 
 Individual 
interviews:  
 
1 FNL, female, combatant 
2 FNL, male, combatant 
2 CNDD-FDD, male, combatant 
1 CNDD-FDD, female combatant 
3 Ex-FAB, male combatant 
Bujumbura 
Rural 
Kabezi Focus group ex-
combatants 
5 men, 9 women 
4 CNDD-FDD, 10 FNL 
Focus group ex-
combatants 
2 men, 9 women 
1 CNDD-FDD, 8 FNL, 1 Ex-FAB, 1 first CNDD later 
FNL 
Kanyosha-rural 
 
 
Focus group 
community 
7 men, 4 women 
 
Focus group ex-
combatants 
6 men, 4 women 
9 FNL, 1 CNDD and later FNL 
Isale 
Focus group 
community 
5 men, 3 women 
Focus group ex-
combatants 
12 men, 3 women 
5 CNDD-FDD, 9 FNL, 1 first CNDD later FNL 
  
 
 
 
Mutimbuzi 
Focus group 
community 
5 men 
Focus group ex-
combatants 
11 men 
4 CNDD-FDD, 4 FNL, 2 Ex-FAB, 1 CNDD-
Nyangoma 
Bubanza Ville 
Focus group 
community 
5 men, 5 women 
Focus group ex-
combatants 
9 men, 2 women 
4 CNDD-FDD, 4 FNL, 3 Ex-FAB 
Bubanza 
Gihanga 
Focus group 
community 
5 men, 5 women 
Focus group ex-
combatants 
12 men 
3 CNDD-FDD, 4 FNL, 3 ex-FAB, 2 Frolina 
Cibitoke 
 
Rubongo 
Focus group 
community 
5 men, 6 women 
Focus group ex-
combatants 
12 men, 2 women 
3 CNDD-FDD, 1 FNL, 5 Ex-FAB, 5 Gardien de la 
Paix 
Focus group 
community 
3 men, 3 women 
Mbuye  
Individual 
interviews: 
Ex-FAB, male, combatant 
Ex-FAB, male combatant 
Gardien de la Paix, male 
Focus group ex-
combatants 
13 men 
1 CNDD-FDD, 3 FNL, 9 Ex-FAB 
Kiganda, 
Kanerwa coline 
Focus group 
community 
3 men, 2 women 
Focus group ex-
combatants 
4 men 
1 CNDD-FDD, 2 Ex-FAB, 1 Gardien de la Paix 
Muramvya 
 
Rutegama 
Focus group 
community 
8 men, 5 women 
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 Individual 
interviews: 
Ex-FAB, female, supportive 
CNDD-FDD, male, combatant 
CNDD-FDD, female, combatant 
Focus group ex-
combatants 
10 men, 1 women  
4 CNDD-FDD, 1 FNL, 6 Ex-FAB 
Focus group 
community 
5 men, 1 women 
 
Muramvya Ville 
Individual 
interviews: 
CNDD-FDD, male, combatant 
Ex-FAB, male, combatant 
Focus group ex-
combatants 
5 men, 1 women  
2 CNDD-FDD, 4 Ex-FAB 
Gitega Ville 
Focus group 
community 
4 men, 5 women 
Gitega, Ruhoba 
colline 
Focus group 
community 
5 men, 3 women 
Focus group ex-
combatants 
9 men  
3 CNDD-FDD, 1 FNL, 5 Ex-FAB 
Itaba 
Focus group 
community 
4 men, 1 women 
Focus group ex-
combatants 
10 men  
5 CNDD-FDD, 3 FNL, 1 Ex-FAB, 1 Frolina 
Mutaho 
Focus group 
community 
3 men, 2 women 
Focus group ex-
combatants 
6 men, 1 women  
4 CNDD-FDD, 3 Ex-FAB 
Gitega 
Kibimba 
Focus group 
community 
4 men, 3 women 
Focus group ex-
combatants 
10 men  
3 CNDD-FDD, 3 Ex-FAB, 2 Gardien le la Paix, 2 
Frolina 
Ruyigi Ville 
Focus group 
community 
2 men, 3 women 
Focus group ex-
combatants 
9 men  
8 CNDD-FDD, 1 Frolina 
Ruyigi 
Butezi 
Focus group 
community 
2 men, 3 women 
Focus group ex-
combatants 
9 men  
2 CNDD-FDD, 7 Ex-FAB 
Ngozi Ruhororo 
Focus group 
community 
5 men 
Focus group ex-
combatants 
11 men  
4 CNDD-FDD, 1 CNDD-Nyangoma, 3 FNL, 3 Ex-
FAB 
Myuinga Myuinga Ville 
Focus group 
community 
3 men, 1 women 
Focus group ex-
combatants 
6 men  
3 CNDD-FDD, 1 FNL, 2 Ex-FAB 
Mwaro Nyabihanga 
Focus group 
community 
7 men, 1 women 
Focus group ex-
combatants 
6 men  
5 CNDD-FDD, 1 Ex-FAB 
Karuzi 
 
Shombo 
Focus group 
community 
6 men, 2 women 
Bururi 
 
Bururi Ville Focus group ex-
combatants 
11 men  
3 Ex-FAB, 3 CNDD-FDD, 2 CNDD-Nyangoma, 3 
FNL 
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Focus group 
community 
5 men, 7 women  
Individual 
interviews:  
Community member, male 
Community member, male 
Focus group ex-
combatants 
10 men  
2 CNDD-FDD, 8 FNL 
Rumonge 
Focus group 
community 
9 men, 3 women 
Focus group ex-
combatants 
11 men  
5 Ex-FAB, 2 CNDD-FDD, 1 CNDD-Nyangoma, 3 
FNL 
Focus group 
community 
8 men, 2 women 
 
Matana  
Individual 
interviews: 
Community member, male 
Community member, male 
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Annex 2: Key informants interviewed 
 
Julie Abbass, consultant, Small Arms Survey 
Bellarmin Bacinoni, Journalist 
Leanne Bayer, World Bank, former PADCO 
Joseph Bigurumwami, IOM, former PADCO 
Maurice Bindinde, UNDP 
Afke Bootsman, UNDP  
Arthur Jeremy Boutellis, SSR/SA programme officer, BINUB 
Tracy Dexter, International Alert 
Florence Ferrari, Spécialiste Développement de Programmes, ICCO 
Gérard Gravel, Conseiller Technique Principal P3P, UNDP 
Lieutenant Colonel Jaques van Haalen, Defence Attaché, Netherlands Embassy 
Adolphe Hasabindero, Expert en Suivi-evaluation PDRT, CNDDR 
Eugène van Kemenade, NIMD 
Gerard Chagniot, deputy SSR/SA, BINUB  
Julie Claveau, Programme Director, MAG  
Pierre-Claver Mbonimpa, Founder president and legal representative, APRODH 
Terence Nahimana, Presidential candidate (independent), former parliamentarian, and  former president Cercle 
d'Initiative pour une Vision Commune (CIVIC)  
M. Goretti Ndacayisaba, Chargée de Programme Plaidoyer et Rapprochement Communautaire, Association 
Dushirehamwe 
Charles Ndayiziga, Director, CENAP 
Joseph Ndayizeye, President, Ligue Iteka 
Rev. Levy Ndikumana, Chief Executive Officer, MiParec 
Jean Chrysostome Ndizeye, Caritas 
Oscar Nduwarugira, MiParec 
Yves Nindorera, Ambassade de Belgique 
Eric Niragira, Président Fondateur et Représentant Légal, CEDAC 
Bosco Nkurunziza, Ligue Iteka (Ligue Burundaise des Droits de l’Homme) 
Thierry R. Nsengiyumva, President, Jamaa 
Dionise Ntaconayigize, CEDAC 
Jéroboam Nzikobanyanka, Coordonnateur de l’ECT, PDRT, CNDDR 
Pia Peeters, Task Manager, Sr. Development Specialist Africa Region, World Bank 
Jeanette Seppen, Chargé d’Affaires, Netherlands Embassy 
Christophe Sebudandi, Executive Director, GRADIS 
Herman Tuyaga, Conseiller Principal au Bureau chargé des Questions Economiques de la Présidence de la 
République, Conseiller Spécial Délegué du Président  de la République et Président de la CNDRR chargé 
de la Supervision du PDRT 
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Annex 3: Verification sessions  
 
Community re-visited: 
Focus group ex-combatants (12 p.) Mutimbuzi 
Focus group community (7 p.) 
Focus group ex-combatants (5 p.) 
Bujumbura 
Rural 
Kabezi 
Focus group community (11 p.) 
Kibimba Focus group ex-combatants & community (12 p.) 
Focus group ex-combatants (5 p.) 
Gitega 
Itaba 
Focus group community (7 p.) 
 
Meeting local NGOs, Gitega 
Aloise, MIPAREC 
Emmanuel, ressources humaines, MIPAREC 
Dieudonné, MIPAREC 
Oscar, MIPAREC 
Chantalle, Programme de réintégration, MIPAREC 
?, MIPAREC 
Cyriac, Self Help Group, MIPAREC 
Victor, MIPAREC 
Joseph, ODAG, organisation de développement de Diocèse de Gitega 
Leopold, MI-RDP 
Donante, démobilisé 
Prospere, démobilisé, point focale Gitega 
?, Mechanisme pour l’ Initiative de la Recherche de Paix et de Développement 
Francois, ex-combattant CNDD-FDD 
Pierre Claver, ex-combattant, représentante des élus locaux 
 
Meeting local NGOs, Bujumbura 
Christian Ngendahimana, Legal representative, Fountain Isoko 
Pascal Kadazi, development committee of the Methodist church 
Tatien Nkeshimana, CENAP 
Dionise Ntagonayigize, CEDAC 
Didier Ndamukunda, Collectif pour la Promotion des Associations des Jeunes (CPAJ) 
General Joseph Nkurunziza, Directeur-General des anciens combattants, Ministère de la Défense et anciens 
 combattants 
Eric Niragira, CEDAC 
Margerite Mushuracey, Association pour la Défense des Droits de les Femmes (ADDF) 
Janvier, representante des femmes ex-combatants, CEDAC 
 
Meeting International NGOs, Bujumbura 
Jean Bosco Ndayishimiye, Oxfam Novib 
Cathrin Daniel, American Friends Service Committee 
Adrien Ndadaye, Search for Common Ground 
Isidore Ntirampeba, expert M&E, cooperation Italienne  
Grace Havyarimana, Avocats Sans Frontieres 
Florence Ferrari. ICCO 
Jacob Enoh-eben, AFSC 
Linda Elviro Konezo, conseil norvegien des refugiees 
66 
 
Ramillo Rudaragi, AFSC 
Sixte Nisasagare, la Benevolencia 
 
Meeting Donors, Bujumbura 
Daphne Lodder, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Embassy Bujumbura, SSD expert 
Julie Abbass, Small Arms Survey, consultant 
Gerard Muringa, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Conseiller Cooperation (formerly at World Bank) 
Joseph Bigurumwami, International Organization for Migration (formerly at PADCO) 
Leanne Bayer, World Bank, DDR specialist (formerly at PADCO) 
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Annex 4: Map of Visited Locations in Burundi 
 
 
Map of Visited Locations, adapted from UN Map No. 3753 Rev. 6 (2004)
 
  
Participating partners:  
 
Centre for Conflict Studies (CCS), Utrecht University 
The Centre for Conflict Studies (CCS) at Utrecht University comprises an interdisciplinary focal point that has a 
unique expertise in the emerging international field of conflict studies. The Centre is working on a programme of 
cutting edge research themes that are closely linked to its educational programme comprising undergraduate and 
graduate courses. Its work reflects contemporary and innovative trends in academic thought. Its studies aim at 
contributing to intellectual debates with regard to current conflict and to prevailing policy practice in the fields of 
conflict prevention and management, and peacebuilding 
 
Centre for International Conflict Analysis and Management (CICAM), Radboud 
University Nijmegen 
The Centre for International Conflict Analysis and Management conducts research and offers academic courses on the 
dynamics and transformation of contemporary, large-scale conflict, focusing in particular on practices of peace-
building intervention and the role of international organizations, the state, and international and local civil society.  
 
Conflict Research Unit of the Clingendael Institute (CRU)  
The Conflict Research Unit of the Clingendael Institute conducts research on the nexus between security and 
development with a special focus on integrated and comprehensive approaches on conflict prevention, stabilization 
and reconstruction in fragile and post-conflict states. 
 
European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP) 
The European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP) is a non-governmental organization that promotes effective 
conflict prevention and peacebuilding strategies and actively supports and connects people who work for peace 
worldwide 
 
IKV Pax Christi 
IKV Pax Christi works as a movement of concerned citizens and partners in conflict areas on the protection of human 
security, the end of armed violence and the construction of just peace. 
 
Netherlands Ministry of Defense 
The Ministry of Defense coordinates the military of the Netherlands. The Dutch armed forces have a threefold 
mission: to protect the integrity of the territory of the Netherlands and that of allied countries; to help maintain 
stability and the international legal order; and to help civil authorities enforce the law, control crises, respond to 
disasters and provide humanitarian assistance either in the Netherlands or abroad.  
 
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs promotes the interests of the Kingdom of the Netherlands abroad. The Ministry 
coordinates and carries out Dutch foreign policy at its headquarters in The Hague and through its missions abroad. It 
is likewise the channel through which the Dutch Government communicates with foreign governments and 
international organizations. 
 
PSO (Capacity Building in Developing Countries) 
PSO is an association that consists of fifty Dutch development organizations. The association focuses on capacity 
development at civil society organizations in developing countries.  
 
Dutch Council for Refugees 
Dutch Council for Refugees defends the rights of refugees and helps them to build a new life in the Netherlands. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
